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The Purchase Money Security Interest and
the Federal Tax Lien: A Proposal for
Legislative Change
By PATRICIA NASSIF FETZER*
"We enter with some trepidation the tortured meanderings of federal
tax lien law, intersected now by the somewhat smoother byway of the
Uniform Commercial Code."
I
Attorneys and legal scholars who have experienced the labyrinthine
dimensions of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 ("F.T.L.A.") 2 can well
appreciate judicial frustration at its "tortured meanderings." Nowhere is
this characterization more apt than when describing the intersection of
the federal tax lien and purchase money security interests arising under
the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.").3
The stated purpose of the F.T.L.A. was to conform federal tax lien
provisions to the changes in security interests wrought by the U.C.C.
4
* Clinical Professor of Law, University of Iowa. B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, University of
Iowa. The author wishes to thank Professors David G. Epstein, Mary Louise Fellows, and
John C. Reitz for their helpful criticisms. The author also thanks her secretary, Fran Swan-
son, for her tireless work on this Article.
1. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir. 1972), cert
denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
2. Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80 Stat. 1125 (1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.). For a comprehensive review of federal tax lien law, see generally W. PLUMB,
FEDERAL TAX LIENS (3d ed. 1972).
3. A "security interest" under the U.C.C. is defined as "an interest in personal property
or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." U.C.C § 1-201(37)
(1978).
A "purchase money security interest" is a security interest that is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value
to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact
so used.
Id. § 9-107. The effect of the F.T.L.A. on security interests arising under the U.C.C. is care-
fully examined by Peter F. Coogan in lB U.C.C. SERV. (MB) §§ 12B.01-12B.10 (1984).
4. The House Report accompanying the bill, H.R. 11256, stated:
Since the adoption of the Federal income tax in 1913, the nature of commercial finan-
cial transactions has changed appreciably. Business practices have been substantially
revised and, as a result, many new types of secured transactions have been developed
[8731
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To this end, the American Bar Association ("ABA") and commercial
organizations had lobbied vigorously for many years.5 The F.T.L.A. as
it finally emerged from Congress contained many of the changes pro-
posed in ABA draft legislation. 6  Conspicuous by its absence, however,
was a provision granting superpriority to purchase money security inter-
ests.7 In this area, Congress apparently rejected the carefully charted
route urged by the ABA and took instead the road less-traveled, and that
has, indeed, made all the difference.
While aspects of F.T.L.A. legislative history indicate that Congress
did intend to prefer purchase money security interests over the federal
tax lien,8 Congress' failure to specifically incorporate this preference has
created an obstacle to effective analysis and application. The absence of a
statutory superpriority leaves several issues of fundamental significance
for ad hoe judicial resolution, including the relationship of purchase
money security interests to current provisions of the F.T.L.A., and the
effect of non-perfection on purchase money priority.
The problems inherent in the present statutory scheme are illus-
trated (albeit in simplified form) by the following hypotheticals: Suppose
that on May 1 Lender (L) enters into a written agreement with debtor/
taxpayer (D), wherein L agrees to loan D $10,000 for use in D's business.
The agreement provides that L has a security interest in D's existing in-
ventory to secure repayment of the loan. L advances the funds and per-
fects its security interest by filing a U.C.C. financing statement.9 On June
... [A] Uniform Commercial Code was promulgated somewhat over 10 years ago
by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. A revised version of this code is already law in over 40 States
and could well be adopted by many of the remaining States in the near future. Under
the Commercial Code, priority now is afforded new types of commercial secured
creditors not previously protected.
This bill is in part an attempt to conform the lien provisions of the internal
revenue laws to the concepts developed in this Uniform Commercial Code.
H.R. REP. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
1884]; see also S. REP. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 1708].
5. See H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 4, at 2; S. REP. No. 1708, supra note 4, at 2;
Priority of Federal Tax Liens and Levies: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means on H.R. 11256 and H.R. 11290, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, 60-216, 225-29 (1966) [herein-
after cited as House Hearings]; 84 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 137, 505-09, 645-745 (1959); infra text
accompanying notes 87-99.
6. See infra notes 92-95 & accompanying text.
7. See infra text accompanying note 95. A prominent scholar in the field of federal tax
liens has deemed this a "noteworthy omission." Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda
-for the Next Decade II, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 667 (1968).
8. See infra notes 105-06 & accompanying text.
9. The most widely used method for perfection of a security interest is the filing of a
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1, notice of a federal tax lien is filed' for unpaid taxes assessed against D
on April 1.11 Section 6321 of the F.T.L.A. provides that the amount of
any unpaid taxes is a lien in favor of the United States on all property
belonging to the taxpayer. The lien arises upon assessment and continues
until the tax liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by lapse of
time.1 2 Because the assessment against D dates from April 1, the tax lien
appears to be superior to L's security interest in the collateral securing
L's loan (i.e., D's inventory).
In such a situation, however, section 6323(a) of the F.T.L.A. comes
into play by providing that: "The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not
be valid as against any. . . holder of a security interest. . . until notice
thereof . . . has been filed by the Secretary." 13 "Security interest" is
later defined as a contractually-acquired interest in property to secure
payment or performance of an obligation that is "protected under local
law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obli-
gation."' 14 This definition is generally held to include a perfected U.C.C.
financing statement under U.C.C. § 9-302 (1978). The financing statement is usually a sepa-
rate document signed by the debtor. It must contain the names and addresses of the debtor
and secured party and a description of the collateral. Id. § 9-402(1). The financing statement
may be filed before the attachment of a security interest. Id. The place of filing varies depend-
ing on the classification of the collateral and the specific filing rules of the enacting state. Id.
§ 9-401.
10. The federal tax lien imposed by I.R.C. § 6321 is not valid against purchasers, holders
of security interests, mechanic's lienors, or judgment lien creditors until notice of the lien is
fied. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1982). The form and content of the notice is prescribed by the Secre-
tary. Id. § 6323(0(3). The place for filing may be designated by state law and, in the absence
of such designation, is in the office of the clerk of the United States district court for the
judicial district within which the subject property is located. Id. § 6323(0(1). See generally
W. PLUMB, supra note 2, at 59-69.
11. In the case of a filed return admitting liability, assessment is simply the notation of
liability on a list of the district director. I.R.C. § 6203 (1982). Demand must be made within
60 days. Id. § 6303(a). When tax liability is understated, assessment generally will follow the
audit and 90 days statutory notice of deficiency. Id. §§ 6212, 6213. Here too, assessment
consists of notation on a list in the district director's office. Thus, a valid tax lien can result
without any public recordation, and this "secret lien" is nevertheless valid against the taxpayer
and most third parties, with the exception of those parties exempt from unfiled liens under
§ 6323(a) or those granted "superpriority" status in § 6323(b). See generally W. PLUMB, supra
note 2, at 10-18.
12. I.R.C. §§ 6321, 6322 (1982). For provisions relating to the period of enforcement,
see id. §§ 6502, 6503.
13. Id. § 6323(a). This provision also exempts purchasers, mechanic's lienors, and judg-
ment lien creditors from unfied tax liens. Id.
14. Id. § 6323(h)(1). The entire section reads:
(1) Security interest The term "security interest" means any interest in property
acquired by contract for the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obli-
gation or indemnifying against loss or liability. A security interest exists at any time
(A) if, at such time, the property is in existence and the interest has become protected
under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obli-
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security interest.1 5 Hence, as a perfected secured creditor, L will prevail
over the later-filed federal tax lien, even though the unpaid taxes were
assessed prior to the written agreement creating L's security interest.
Should the result in the preceding hypothetical change if the lender
holds a purchase money security interest? Such an interest arises, for
example, if L loans money to D in order to enable D to purchase the
specified inventory in which L is granted a security interest.16 Certainly,
L should be entitled to the same priority in this hypothetical if its secur-
ity interest is properly perfected. If, however, L's security interest is not
perfected before the tax lien filing, the result is unclear. On the face of
the statute, an unperfected secured creditor loses the protection of sec-
tion 6323(a), even though its security interest attaches before the tax lien
is filed. There is no special superpriority provision to exempt purchase
money security interests from this perfection requirement.1 7 Neverthe-
less, pre-F.T.L.A. case law18 and a liberal reading of legislative history1 9
gation, and (B) to the extent that, at such time, the holder has parted with money or
money's worth.
15. Manalis Fin. Co. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Soldov
v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978)). But see Dragstrem v. Obermeyer, 549 F.2d 20 (7th Cir.
1977) (security interest need not be perfected under U.C.C. to be protected under local law
against a subsequent judgment lien within I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1982)).
The precise language of § 6323(h)(1) seems to be at odds with the U.C.C. concept of "lien
creditor" in § 9-301, although it appears that a similar concept must have been intended de-
spite the difference in terminology. An unperfected secured party is subordinate to "a person
who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b)
(1978). A "lien creditor" is "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by
attachment, levy or the like . I..." Id. § 9-301(3). One scholar has noted:
Unfortunately, Congress used the term "judgment lien" and not "judicial lien."
Under the law of almost all states, a judgment lien does not attach to personal prop-
erty, and therefore, even an unperfected UCC security interest would be superior to a
judgment lien. Cf. UCC 9-201. Such a result would be inconsistent with prior law,
and there is no indication that in revising the Act, Congress intended to accord prior-
ity to unperfected security interests over tax liens. Instead, it is more likely that
Congress did not understand what a judical lien was and that the courts will have to
interpret judgment lien to include some other types of judicial liens which would be
superior to unperfected security interests under 9-301. Unfortunately, however, at
least one court failed to get the message. Major Electrical Supplies, Inc. v. J.W.
Pettit Co., 427 F. Supp. 752 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
D. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 110-11 n.* (2d ed.1980).
16. See U.C.C. § 9-107(b) (1978).
17. The definition of "security interest" in the F.T.L.A. makes no distinction between a
purchase money and non-purchase money security interest. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1982). Sec-
tion 6323(b) contains 10 instances of third-party protection, even if a federal tax lien is filed.
Id. § 6323(b). Purchase money security interests are not among these protected transactions,
despite proposals made at the time of the F.T.L.A. congressional hearings to enact a special
purchase money superpriority. See infra notes 94-96, 112-13 & accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 36-39 & accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 103-06 & accompanying text.
[Vol. 36
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTERESTS
may persuade a court inclined to broad statutory construction to excuse
purchase money interests from the ordinary priority rules of section
6323(a).
The analytical complexities expand in the case of the "floating lien"
financer.20 Returning to the first hypothetical, suppose that the May 1
agreement between L and D now contemplates an ongoing financing ar-
rangement. L agrees to make an immediate loan of $10,000, and to make
additional future advances. 21 All indebtedness, including any future ad-
vances made by L, is secured by D's existing inventory and by all inven-
tory that D subsequently acquires. 22 On June 15, L, without knowledge
of the June 1 tax lien filing, advances an additional $10,000; D continues
to sell existing inventory and to acquire additional inventory. On July 1,
L learns of the tax lien filing. Can L claim priority for its security inter-
est in the inventory acquired after the June 1 tax lien filing, and if so, can
its priority cover post-filing advances?
Before the 1966 revisions to the F.L.T.A., the lender's priority was
problematic because of a judicial gloss on the federal tax lien statute
known as the "choateness" doctrine.2 3 With the widespread adoption of
the U.C.C. in the 1950's and 19601s,24 however, floating lien financing
received official imprimatur,25 and pressure mounted for limited protec-
tion against the federal tax lien. Recognizing the economic benefits con-
ferred by floating lien financing, Congress responded with a significant
reform in section 6323(c) of the F.T.L.A. This wordy and complex pro-
vision now entitles the lender to priority for all advances made within
20. The term "floating lien" is popularly used to describe the security interest derived
through a security agreement covering after-acquired property and future advances. See
U.C.C. § 9-204 (1978). The term itself is not used in article 9, although the comment to § 9-
204 refers to a "continuing general lien" and the "floating charge." Id. comment 2.
21. Section 9-204(3) provides: "Obligations covered by a security agreement may include
future advances or other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to
commitment ... " Id. § 9-204(3).
22. Section 9-204(1) provides: "[A] security agreement may provide that any or all obli-
gations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral."
However, "[n]o security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to consumer
goods other than accessions. . . when given as additional security unless the debtor acquires
rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives value." Id. § 9-204(2).
23. See infra notes 72-82 & accompanying text.
24. See infra text accompanying note 83.
25. The general pre-Code intolerance of floating lien financing, particularly acute in the
nineteenth century, was based on fears of creditor monopolization of a debtor's resources. See
U.C.C § 9-204 comment 2 (1978). Article 9 of the U.C.C. rejected this position on pragmatic
rather than policy grounds. The "cushion of free assets" was not, in fact, preserved because of
the proliferation of security devices designed to avoid it, such as trust receipts, factor's liens,
and so forth. Hence, article 9's sanction of the floating lien "merely recognizes an existing
state of things." Id.
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forty-five days of tax lien filing, if those advances are made without
knowledge of the tax lien filing. 26 The lender can also assert a prior in-
26. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(1), (2) (1982). These complex and circuitous sections provide in full:
(c) Protection for certain commercial transactions financing agreements, etc.
(1) In general
To the extent provided in this subsection, even though notice of a lien imposed by
section 6321 has been filed, such lien shall not be valid with respect to a security
interest which came into existence after tax lien filing but which-
(A) is in qualified property covered by the terms of a written agreement entered
into before tax lien filing and constituting-
(i) a commercial transactions financing agreement,
(ii) a real property construction or improvement financing agreement, or
(iii) an obligatory disbursement agreement, and
(B) is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of
tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation.
(2) Commercial transactions financing agreement.
For purposes of this subsection-
(A) Definition
The term "commercial transactions financing agreement" means an agreement
(entered into by a person in the course of his trade or business)--
(i) to make loans to the taxpayer to be secured by commercial financing
security acquired by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of his trade or
business, or
(ii) to purchase commercial financing security (other than inventory) ac-
quired by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of his trade or business;
but such an agreement shall be treated as coming within the term only to the
extent that such loan or purchase is made before the 46th day after the date of
tax lien filing or (if earlier) before the lender or purchaser had actual notice or
knowledge of such tax lien filing.
(B) Limitation on qualified property
The term "qualified property," when used with respect to a commercial transac-
tions financing agreement, includes only commercial financing security acquired
by the taxpayer before the 46th day after the date of tax lien filing.
(C) Commercial financing security defined
The term "commercial financing security" means (i) paper of a kind ordinarily
arising in commercial transactions, (ii) accounts receivable, (iii) mortgages on
real property, and (iv) inventory.
(D) Purchaser treated as acquiring security interest
A person who satisfies subparagraph (A) by reason of clause (ii) thereof shall be
treated as having acquired a security interest in commercial financing security.
See also id. § 6323(d), which is not limited to "commercial financing security," as is § 6323(c).
I.R.C. § 6323(d) (1982) provides:
(d) 45-day period for making disbursements
Even though notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 has been filed, such lien
shall not be valid with respect to a security interest which came into existence after
tax lien filing by reason of disbursements made before the 46th day after the date of
tax lien filing, or (if earlier) before the person making such disbursements had actual
notice or knowledge of tax lien filing, but only if such security interest-
(1) is in property (A) subject, at the time of tax lien filing, to the lien imposed
by section 6321, and (B) covered by the terms of a written agreement entered
into before tax lien filing, and
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terest in any "commercial financing security" 27 acquired by the debtor
within forty-five days of tax lien filing, regardless of the lender's
knowledge.
28
In the above hypothetical, L has an interest superior to the federal
tax lien in D's inventory existing on the date of tax lien filing, as well as
in the inventory D acquires within forty-five days thereafter. L can assert
its security interest in this collateral to satisfy a total indebtedness of
$20,000, because the second $10,000 advance was made without knowl-
edge and within forty-five days of tax lien filing.
The floating lien financer thus receives broader protection from the
encroachment of the federal tax lien under the F.T.L.A., but these rights
derive from a security interest created and perfected before tax lien filing.
If a second financer, F, appears after tax lien filing, advances $10,000,
and obtains and perfects a security interest in D's existing inventory, F,
unlike L, is not considered a "holder of a security interest" at the time of
tax lien filing.29 F's security interest will therefore be inferior to the ear-
lier federal tax lien.
Should this result change if the second financer's loan was used to
acquire the inventory in which it claims a security interest? Although
such a post-filing purchase money loan may resemble, both in character
and function, the post-filing advances of a floating lien financer, the
F.T.L.A. still appears to subject the second financer's interest to a filed
federal tax lien. Nevertheless, a liberal reading of legislative history30 and
post-F.T.L.A. authority, 31 including an Internal Revenue Service Reve-
nue Ruling,32 suggests that purchase money security interests acquired
after tax lien filing should be accorded special priority.33
The analytical difficulties suggested by the foregoing examples are
all the more troublesome because they are unnecessary. These problems
in applying the F.L.T.A. did not arise from the passage of time, but from
Congress' failure to deal expressly with the purchase money issue. The
(2) is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of
tax lien filing, out of an unsecured obligation.
27. This term includes commercial paper, accounts receivable, real property mortgages,
and inventory. Id. § 6323(c)(2)(C).
28. Id. § 6323(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)-(C).
29. Although F may otherwise qualify as a holder of a security interest within the mean-
ing of I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1), the status was not attained until after tax lien filing. Section
6323(a) protects only existing holders of security interests against an unfiled tax lien. Id.
§ 6323(a).
30. See infra notes 103.06 & accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 118-27 & accompanying text.
32. See infra note 121 & accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 208-13 & accompanying text.
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enactment of a purchase money superpriority can now fill the void left by
congressional inaction.
There are strong historical and policy reasons favoring such a legis-
lative change. First, pre-U.C.C. case law traditionally deferred to
purchase money interests, a preference now reflected in the U.C.C. prior-
ity provisions. 34 Second, the legislative history of the F.T.L.A. itself in-
dicated an intent to favor purchase money interests. This position is
adopted in the few extant I.R.S. pronouncements on the subject. Finally,
and fundamentally, the debtor/taxpayer's post-filing estate is enhanced
through the risks and resources of the purchase money secured party.
To permit the government, a non-reliance creditor, 35 to benefit from the
contributions of a purchase money creditor would discourage needed en-
richment or rehabilitation of a debtor/taxpayer's estate. The impetus for
reform initiated by the ABA has diminished since the enactment of the
F.T.L.A., but the continuing vitality of these historical and policy ratio-
nales and the persistence of unresolved priority questions should impel a
renewed interest in legislative reform.
The purpose of this Article is to advance the case for the enactment
of a purchase money superpriority. First, the Article describes the fa-
vored position accorded to purchase money interests both outside and
within the U.C.C. Next, the Article examines the impact of this favored
position on the legislative history of the F.T.L.A. The Article then criti-
cally reviews applicable case law and non-judicial indicia of construction.
It next details the special analytical problems posed by the present statu-
tory scheme. Finally, the Article concludes with a proposal for legislative
change and discusses its expected salutory effect on the interpretation
and application of the F.T.L.A.
Preferential Treatment of the Purchase Money Security Interest
An examination of the unique place occupied by purchase money
interests within article 9 of the U.C.C., as well as their favored position
under pre-Code law, strongly supports the addition of a purchase money
superpriority to the F.T.L.A. The notion that purchase money interests
34. See infra notes 43-55 & accompanying text.
35. As used herein, the term "non-reliance creditor" means that the government has not
extended credit based on any representations of the debtor/taxpayer or the existence or non-
existence of competing creditors, including secured creditors. Its lien arises for unpaid taxes
and cuts the broad swath authorized by I.R.C. §§ 6321 and 6323 (1982). See supra notes 12-
14, 26-27 & accompanying text. Hence, according to the reasoning of some courts, the govern-
ment would not be prejudiced by the failure to record a purchase money interest. See infra
note 131.
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should prevail over prior claimants has "venerable roots."' 36 In the semi-
nal 1870 case of United States v. New Orleans Railroad,37 the United
States Supreme Court forged the concept of purchase money priority
over after-acquired property interests. The Court reasoned that "[a]
mortgage intended to cover after-acquired property, can only attach itself
to such property in the condition in which it comes into the mortgagor's
hands."'38 By the end of the nineteenth century, the special priority of
purchase money lenders appeared to be as well fixed as that of purchase
money sellers, with some equitable limitations.
39
The drafters of the U.C.C. acknowledged their debt to this pre-Code
law in according distinct treatment to the purchase money interest.4°
This interest was deemed a "purchase money security interest" and em-
braced chattel mortgages, conditional sales and other pre-Code security
devices.41 Section 9-107 defines a purchase money security interest as a
36. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 28.1, at 745
(1965). Gilmore notes that these roots may extend back to a 1631 decision and Lord Coke's
venerated commentaries. Id. He observes that the "traditional rationalization" for the doc-
trine of purchase money priority in the real property arena was the "delightful idea of transi-
tory or instantaneous seisin," id., whereby "title shot into the grantee and out of him again into
the purchase-money mortgagee so fleetingly. . . that no other interest has time to fasten itself
to it." Id. at 746 (quoting G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 557-58 (1951)). For a detailed discus-
sion of purchase money priority under pre-U.C.C. law, see 2 G. GILMORE, supra, § 28.
37. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1870).
38. Id. at 365. The Court determined that the United States, which had sold certain
rolling stock to a railroad company, had an interest superior to those bondholders claiming the
collateral under the after-acquired property clauses of their mortgages. Id. See 2 G. GIL-
MORE, supra note 36, § 28.1, at 743-53 for a discussion of the case and its antecedents.
39. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 36, § 28.1, at 749. Among the "equitable limitations"
were restrictions on interests obtained through confidential relationships and a narrow defini-
tion of purchase money claims. Id. at 749-53.
40. The comment to § 9-312 of the U.C.C. provides:
Prior law, under one or another theory, usually contrived to protect purchase money
interests over after-acquired property interests (to the extent to which the after-ac-
quired property interest was recognized at all). . . . While this Article broadly vali-
dates the after-acquired property interest, it also recognizes as sound the preference
which prior law gave to the purchase money interest ....
U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1978); see also id. § 9-107 comment 1.
41. U.C.C. § 9-102 states that article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form)
which is intended to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures .... " id. § 9-
102(l)(a), including "security interests created by contract including pledge, assignment, chat-
tel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust
receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or consignment intended as security
. .. Id. § 9-102(2). The comment explains that article 9 "does not in terms abolish ex-
isting security devices." Id. § 9-102 comment 1. But the provisions of article 9 will govern,
regardless of the security device used, if a transaction is "intended to have effect as security."
Id.
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security interest that is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obliga-
tion gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
42
Among the provisions granting favored treatment to purchase
money security interests are U.C.C. sections 9-312(3) and (4). These sec-
tions carve out exceptions to the general "first to file or perfect" rule of
section 9-312(5), under which priority depends on the order of acts taken
by secured parties to maximize the protection of their security interests. 43
Section 9-312(3) governs the contest between a perfected purchase
money security interest in inventory and a conflicting security interest in
the same inventory. The latter is typically an interest asserted under an
after-acquired property clause. Although it generally defers to the pre-
Code preference for the purchase money interest, 44 this provision never-
theless requires the purchase money secured party to fulfill several condi-
tions in order to claim priority. These conditions include perfection at
the time the debtor takes possession and notice to certain holders of con-
flicting security interests. 45 The provision further limits the priority to
42. Id. § 9-107. Lenders as well as sellers may therefore be classified as purchase money
secured parties, but excluded from this definition are security interests "taken as security for or
in satisfaction of a pre-existing claim or antecedent debt." Id. § 9-107 comment 2.
43. Section 9-312(5) provides that for conflicting security interests in the same collateral
not otherwise governed by the specific priority rules of § 9-312:
(a) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfec-
tion. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the collateral or the
time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is earlier, provided that there is
no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
(b) So long as conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has
priority.
Id. § 9-312(5). This rule governs purchase money security interests that do not qualify for the
special priorities of §§ 9-312(3) and (4). See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 25-3 to 25-5 (2d ed. 1980).
44. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1978).
45. The section provides:
(3) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over a
conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in identifiable
cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer if
(a) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor re-
ceives possession of the inventory; and
(b) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the holder
of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing statement cover-
ing the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing made by the purchase
money secured party, or (ii) before the beginning of the 21 day period where the
purchase money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession
(subsection (5) of Section 9-304); and
(c) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within
five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
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the inventory itself and "identifiable cash proceeds received on or before
the delivery of the inventory to a buyer,"'46 thus enabling the holder of a
security interest in after-acquired inventory to claim priority in non-cash
proceeds such as accounts.
Section 9-312(4) gives broader priority to purchase money security
interests in collateral other than inventory. This priority extends to all
proceeds, and conditions the priority only on perfection of the purchase
money security interest at or within ten days of the time the debtor re-
ceives possession of the collateral.47
Another instance of special treatment for purchase money interests
is found in U.C.C. section 9-301, which contains priority rules affecting
unperfected security interests. Generally, this section subordinates un-
perfected interests to those of lien creditors, 48 non-ordinary course buy-
ers,49 and other specified parties.50  Subsection 9-301(2) nevertheless
(d) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to
acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describing
such inventory by item or type.
Id. § 9-312(3).
46. Id. This limitation was a concession to the expectations of floating lienors involved in
inventory financing, when it is anticipated that the inventory will be sold and "where financing
frequently is based on the resulting accounts, chattel paper, or other proceeds . Id. § 9-
312 comment 3.
47. This section provides: "A purchase money security interest in collateral other than
inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds
if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of
the collateral or within ten days thereafter." Id. § 9-312(4). The notification requirement of
§ 9-312(3) is not carried over into § 9-312(4) "[s]ince an arrangement for periodic advances
against incoming property is unusual outside the inventory field. ... Id. § 9-312 comment
3.
48. Id. § 9-301(1)(b). A lien creditor is defined as
a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or
the like and includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment,
and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition or a receiver in
equity from the time of appointment.
Id. § 9-301(3).
49. Id. § 9-301(1)(c). Section 9-307 provides that a buyer in the ordinary course, except
for one who buys farm products from a person engaged in farming, "takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though the
buyer knows of its existence." Id. § 9-307(l). A "buyer in ordinary course of business" is a
good faith purchaser of goods without knowledge that the sale violates a third party's security
interest who "buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind. . . ." Id. § 1-201(9). Section 9-301 subordinates unperfected secured interests to trans-
ferees in bulk and other buyers not in the ordinary course, as well as buyers of farm products in
the ordinary course who are excluded from § 9-307. Id. § 9-301(l)(c). The priority is condi-
tioned on the buyer giving value and receiving delivery of the collateral "without knowledge of
the security interest and before it is perfected." Id; see id. § 9-301 comment 4.
50. The specified parties include persons entitled to priority under § 9-312, id. § 9-
301(l)(a), and transferees for value of accounts and general intangibles. Id. § 9-301(1)(d).
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saves purchase money security interests from subordination to bulk
transferees and lien creditors if they are perfected by filing before or
within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral.
5 1
This provision, together with the ten-day grace period of section 9-
312(4), gives the purchase money secured party broad and privileged
protection against competing claims of lien creditors, bulk transferees,
and non-inventory secured parties.
52
Still other U.C.C. provisions embody the traditional preference for
purchase money interests. Section 9-313(4), for example, contains a pri-
ority rule favoring perfected purchase money security interests in fixtures
over the conflicting interests of encumbrancers or owners of real estate,
with a similar ten-day grace period for perfection. 53 Additionally, sec-
tion 9-302(l)(d) excepts from the perfection-by-filing rule a purchase
money security interest in consumer goods, 54 This provision defers to
pre-Code law that waived filing requirements for security interests in
consumer goods under conditional sales agreements or bailment leases.
55
The reasons justifying such priorities for purchase money interests
are closely related and generally self-evident. Although title to collateral
is immaterial under article 9 of the U.C.C.,5 6 pre-Code decisions often
51. This section provides:
If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before or
within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority
over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between the
time the security interest attaches and the time of filing.
Id. § 9-301(2). The comment notes that some pre-Code chattel mortgage statutes had grace
periods for filing. The Uniform Conditional Sales Act had a 10-day grace period that cut off
all intervening interests. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act had a 30-day grace period, but did
not cut off a purchaser who took delivery of the collateral before the filing. Id. § 9-301 com-
ment 5.
52. See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 36, § 29.5, at 799-800. A similar 10-day
grace period is found in U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) (1978) affecting purchase money security inter-
ests in fixtures. See id. § 9-313 comment 4(a).
53. U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(a) (1978). However, construction mortgages recorded before the
goods became fixtures will prevail over even purchase money security interests, if the goods
become fixtures before the completion of construction. Id. § 9-313(6).
Another article 9 provision embodying a similar "enhancement of collateral" priority rule
is § 9-314, dealing with accessions. Id. § 9-314.
54. Id. § 9-302(l)(d). But filing is required "for a motor vehicle required to be regis-
tered," and fixture filing must be made as provided in § 9-313. Id. This provision was deemed
the only "permanent exception" from the general filing requirement. Id. § 9-302 comment 4.
But see id. § 9-307(2), in which an unfiled interest in consumer goods is subordinate to the
interest of a buyer who purchases consumer goods without knowledge from a consumer.
55. Id. § 9-302 comment 4. The provision changes law in some jurisdictions where all
conditional sales and bailment leases were subject to a filing requirement. Id.
56. Id. § 9-202. The drafters sought to avoid any determination of whether a title theory
or lien theory should be followed in cases where the application of another rule of law may
turn on the question of title. Id. § 9-202 comment.
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relied on a retained title theory to favor the purchase money interest over
an existing lienor. Courts reasoned, for example, that an after-acquired
property interest could only attach to what the debtor acquired, and was
therefore inferior to the interest of a purchase money party with a re-
tained legal title or other encumbrance on the debtor's ownership inter-
est.5 7 A similar theory was used in pre-F.T.L.A. cases to subject the
federal tax lien to purchase money interests. The courts in these cases
reasoned that the taxpayer/debtor had no property interest under state
law to which the lien could attach.58 It also has been widely recognized
that the debtor's estate is enhanced by a purchase money transaction,
and that purchase money priority encourages the acquisition of new as-
sets and averts a monopoly of the debtor's resources.
5 9
A similar tradition in real property law supports this deference to
purchase money interests in personal property. Under the doctrine of
transitory or instantaneous seisin,
title [to real estate] shot into the grantee and out of him again into the
purchase money mortgage so fleetingly-quasi uno flattu, in one
breath, as it were-that no other interest had time to fasten itself to it:
the grantee-mortgagor [was] regarded as a mere conduit.
6°
Other rationales for preferring purchase money mortgages were that the
purchaser's title was charged with the encumbrance so that all that was
transferred was the right of redemption, 61 or that the mortgage merely
replaced and took the priority of a prior equitable interest.62 Finally, the
"intrinsic fairness," justice, and equity of a rule protecting the creditor
who parted with his own property to the enrichment of a debtor's estate
57. See United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362, 364-65 (1870);
U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1978). See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 36, § 28.1, at 743-
47.
58. See, eg., Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1961); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wall, 239 F. Supp. 433 (W.D.N.C. 1965); United States v. Leba-
non Woolen Mills Corp., 241 F. Supp. 393 (D.N.H. 1964); United States v. Anders Con-
tracting Co., 111 F. Supp. 700 (W.D.S.C. 1953); see also In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.
1960) (executory contract for payment of jackets when made by taxpayer/debtor irrevocably
assigned as security did not constitute "property belonging to" taxpayer subject to federal tax
lien).
59. In Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238 (1978), the Court said: "The purchase-
money mortgage priority is based upon recognition that the mortgagee's interest merely re-
flects his contribution of property to the taxpayer's estate and therefore does not prejudice
creditors who are prior in time." Id. at 258 n.23; see J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 43,
§ 25-5, at 1043.
60. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 390 (2d ed. 1970); see also 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 36,
§ 28.1, at 745-46.
61. G. OSBORNE, supra note 60, at 391.
62. Id.
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was said to justify priority over other claimants.
63
Whatever the articulated rationale, the entitlement of a purchase
money creditor to a superior interest in the collateral acquired through
its own business risk is now well-established and is given continued vital-
ity through the momentum of case law and the U.C.C. The pervasive
preference for purchase money interests in pre-U.C.C. case law and the
statutory scheme of the U.C.C. itself, bolstered by policy considerations,
support the enactment of a purchase money superpriority in the
F.T.L.A. A consideration of the background and legislative history of
the F.T.L.A. lends further support to this view.
Background and Legislative History of the
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966
An examination of the background and legislative history of the
F.T.L.A. sends conflicting signals on the question of purchase money pri-
ority. On the one hand, the impetus for reform and statements of legisla-
tive intent support a continued preference for purchase money interests.
On the other hand, Congress' failure to enact the proposed superpriority
implies a rejection of purchase money priority. On balance, however,
both the history of the federal tax lien and the later reform efforts sup-
port the concept of purchase money superpriority.
The Federal Tax Lien, Judicial Construction, and the Impetus for Legislative
Reform
The notion of the federal government's entitlement to priority for
certain claims is almost as old as the republic itself.64 The provision gen-
erally referred to as section 3466 of the Revised Statutes has ancient fed-
eral roots. 65 In its current form, the statute provides that in certain cases
of insolvency "the debts due to the United States shall be first satis-
fied."' 66 The federal tax lien had its genesis in post-Civil War legisla-
63. Id. at 391-92. See generally Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 393-94 & n.2 (Utah
1983).
64. See generally Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77
YALE L.J. 228, 233-35 & 234 n.45 (1968).
65. See generally id. at 233-34; 1B U.C.C. SERV. (MB) § 12B.01, at 12B-3 to -4 (1984).
66. The United States Code which applies to all debts of an insolvent, provides in it
present form:
Priority of government claims
(a)(1) A claim of the United States Government shall be paid first when-
(A) a person indebted to the Government is insolvent and-
(i) the debtor without enough property to pay all debts makes a vol-
untary assignment of property; (ii) property of the debtor, if absent, is attached; or
(iii) an act of bankruptcy is committed; or
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tion.67 Originally, this "secret lien" for taxes prevailed over even a bona
fide purchaser.68 The apparent inequity of this result impelled Congress
to amend the statute in 1913 to protect purchasers, mortgagees, and
judgment creditors69 from unfiled federal tax liens. The category of pro-
tected persons was enlarged in 1939 to include pledgees.70 The 1939 leg-
islation also created "superpriorities" in favor of specified purchasers and
creditors, entitling them to prevail over even existing and filed tax liens.
71
Alongside the apparent security afforded certain competing claim-
ants by these provisions, and despite judicial lip-service to a "first in
time/first in right" principle applicable to other non-federal lienors, 72 an
unsettling line of Supreme Court decisions having particularly ominous
overtones for consensual lienholders developed. Deemed by one scholar
as "[t]he great mutation in the history of the priority of federal claims,"
'73
the rule emerging from these decisions was the doctrine of "choateness":
a competing lien, though first in time and wholly valid and perfected
under state law, was inchoate and thus inferior to the federal claim if the
lienor's identity, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the
lien were not fixed and certain. 74 This doctrine, whose roots are gener-
ally attributed to a 1929 Supreme Court decision,75 was applied first to
federal claims under section 3466 of the Revised Statutes and later to
federal tax lien claims.
76
(B) the estate of a deceased debtor, in the custody of the executor or administra-
tor, is not enough to pay all debts of the debtor.
(2) This subsection does not apply to a case under title 11.
31 U.S.C. § 3713(a) (1982).
67. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107; see also Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78,
13 Stat. 470.
68. This type of lien was described as "secret" because it did not need to be filed to
prevail against certain third persons. See United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893); supra
note 11.
69. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016.
70. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401, 53 Stat. 882.
71. These superpriorities were for purchasers and lenders having "securities" as security.
Id. at 883. In 1964 this category of superpriorities was enlarged to include purchasers of
motor vehicles. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 127. In 1966 the F.T.L.A.
added a number of new superpriorities. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(2) (1982); see infra note 100.
72. See United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 87 (1954). See generally
Plumb, supra note 64, at 230.
73. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 36, § 40.3, at 1052.
74. See generally id. § 40.3; Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign
of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IOWA L. REV. 724 (1965); Kennedy,
The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and
General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954).
75. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929); see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note
36, § 40.3, at 1052.
76. See authorities cited supra note 74.
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Over the years, the choateness doctrine was used to subordinate
mechanic's, surety's, attorney's, landlord's, and attachment liens to the
federal tax lien. 77  After an enigmatic 1958 decision in which the
Supreme Court apparently applied the doctrine to defeat a lien arising
out of the assignment of accounts receivable,78 there were numerous
cases subordinating consensual security interests. 79 Thereafter, many
courts refused to protect security arrangements covering future ad-
vances80 and after-acquired property,81 in what has been colorfully de-
scribed as a judicial "parlor game" to second-guess the Supreme Court.
82
The timing of these federal tax lien decisions in the late 1950's and
early 1960's was particularly troublesome to the commercial community.
This same period witnessed the widespread adoption of the new
U.C.C., 8 3 and with it, floating lien financing received an important statu-
tory boost. Despite traditional judicial and legislative hostility towards
potential monopolization of a debtor's collateral,8 4 the U.C.C. drafters
opted in favor of a "continuing general lien," whose basic components
were the clauses for after-acquired property and future advances. 85 This
statutory encouragement for the use of floating lien financing was tem-
pered by the possible repercussions of the judicially-developed choateness
doctrine. It was against this backdrop of commercial vitality and legal
77. See, e.g., United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963) (mortgagee's lien
for attorney's fees); United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (surety's lien);
United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (mechanic's lien); United
States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955) (mechanic's lien); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211
(1955) (attachment lien); United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) (real estate
tax lien); United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945) (landlord's
lien). For a detailed summary of the problem and significant case law, see generally Report of
the Special Committee on Federal Liens, 84 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 645 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Report of the Special Committee].
78. United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958). The case involved the
assignment of amounts owed by a general contractor to a subcontractor to the subcontractor's
surety as security for the surety's potential liability. Five justices held the assignment was
inchoate in a per curiam opinion.
79. See generally 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 36, § 40.4.
80. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Sundberg, 58 Wash. 2d 337, 363 P.2d 99 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962).
81. See, e.g., Dean Constr. Corp. v. Simonetta Concrete Constr. Co., 37 F.R.D. 242
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Randall v. Colby, 190 F. Supp. 319, 341 (N.D. Iowa 1961); In re Hudon &
Son, Inc., 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9517 (D. Mass. 1964); Stockholders Publishing Co. v.
Smith, 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9420 (S.D. Cal. 1956). The choateness doctrine did not die
with the F.T.L.A. See Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F. 2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
82. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 36, § 40.5, at 1062.
83. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 43, § 1.
84. See U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 2 (1978).
85. Id. § 9-204; see supra note 25.
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confusion that the American Bar Association began its vigorous efforts to
reform the federal tax lien provisions.
86
American Bar Association Reform Efforts and Draft Legislation
The American Bar Association has been properly credited with ini-
tiating the process that culminated in enactment of the F.T.L.A. 87 A
study of ABA reform efforts not only elucidates the reasons for the 1966
changes, but underscores the void left by Congressional failure to enact
specific provisions regarding purchase money priority. Congress' rejec-
tion of an ABA legislative proposal for purchase money superpriority
belies the simplistic approach to legislative history that has characterized
popular legal opinion on the question.
88
In the mid-1950's, responding primarily to creditor interests, several
sections of the ABA began independent studies to consider remedial leg-
islation affecting the federal tax lien. In 1958, the work of these sections
was taken up by a special committee created by the House of Delegates,
known as the "Special Committee on Federal Liens." In its final report
to the House of Delegates,8 9 the Committee noted its concern that the
succession of recent Supreme Court decisions had extended the scope of
the federal tax lien to an unsettling degree.90 This, in turn, had a "severe
impact" on business and commercial transactions, and had caused in-
creasing concern to business lawyers.91
Opting for what it termed a "selective federal" approach,92 the
Committee proposed draft legislation to modernize the federal tax lien
statutes and to protect the legitimate business needs of commercial
financers. The draft legislation included proposals to subordinate the tax
lien to obligatory future advances, as well as to advances for processing,
completing, repairing, or preserving existing collateral. The legislation
also afforded a measure of protection for accessions to property, substitu-
86. Although dissatisfaction with the choateness doctrine was a major spur to reform, the
doctrine itself still survives. In J.D. Court Inc. v. United States, 712 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1983),
the court said: "We disagree with the. . . contention that the Tax Lien Act of 1966 abrogated
the 'choateness doctrine.'" Id. at 262.
87. See authorities cited supra note 5.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 118-34.
89. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 77, at 645.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 648. The Special Committee considered a proposal for a statutory amendment
to provide for a determination of priority disputes under state law. Id. at 647. It rejected this
in favor of the "selective federal" approach, "under which, on a selective nationally uniform
basis, Congress would determine how far state law priorities shall govern as against the federal
tax lien." Id.
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tion of collateral, and creditor-financed after-acquired property.
93
The F.T.L.A. as it emerged from Congress several years later en-
93. Title I, § 6323(a)(2) of the draft legislation protected the post-tax lien filing priority
rights of those holding security for obligatory future advances and those advances necessary to
complete construction, contracts, or crops or to insure, repair, or preserve the collateral. In
the case of optional future advances, the section provided a notification system:
(2) SECURITY FOR FUTURE OBLIGATIONS .- With respect to any portion of
the consideration for a security interest which is disbursed or delivered, or required
to be disbursed or delivered, after the filing of notice of the lien under section 6321
pursuant to subsection (k), and more than 30 days after the security interest becomes
effective, the priority otherwise existing under applicable law and this subsection
shall be recognized only if-
(A) The holder of the security interest or the predecessor in interest of such
holder became obligated, at or before the time of filing of notice of the lien under
section 6321 pursuant to subsection (k), to disburse or deliver such consideration or
to make surety payments upon the happening of an event beyond the control of such
person; or
(B) The security interest indemnifies the holder against a loss or liability, the
incurring of which depends upon conditions which are beyond the control of such
holder at the time of the filing of notice of the lien under section 6321 pursuant to
subsection (k); or
(C) The security interest secures a single public issue of securities; or
(D) The holder of the security interest or the predecessor in interest of such
holder has, before the filing of notice of the lien under section 6321, pursuant to
subsection (k), made loans, delivered merchandise on credit, incurred liabilities or
undertaken surety obligations, for the purpose of the purchase, acquisition, construc-
tion, improvement, alteration, repair, replacement or demolition, or processing or
manufacturing to a further or finished state, of the property subject to the security
interest, or for the performance or completion of a contract the proceeds of which are
subject to the security interest, or for raising or harvesting a crop or livestock, and
subsequent loans, payments or extensions of credit are actually used to continue or
accomplish the same purpose.
(E) In all other cases, the holder of the security interest or the predecessor in
interest of such holder has disbursed or delivered such consideration more than 15
days but less than one year after actual delivery to the Secretary or his delegate of a
written notification of the financing arrangement, accompanied by the requisite fee,
and the Secretary or his delegate has not in writing or by collect telegram advised the
person specified in such notification (or in an amendment thereof delivered at least 15
days previously) that a notice of the lien under section 6321 has been filed . . . . If,
at the time of the disbursement or delivery of such consideration, the filing of a notice
of the lien under section 6321 is actually known or reasonably should have been
known to any responsible individual acting in the transaction as or on behalf of the
then holder of the security interest, such knowledge shall have the same effect as such
written or telegraphic advice from the Secretary or his delegate.
Report of the Special Committee, supra note 77, at 684-85 app.; see also id. at 653, 702-03 app.
With respect to creditor financed after-acquired property, accessions, and substitutions of
collateral, tit. I, § 6323(a)(3) of the draft legislation provided:
(3) AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY.-In the case of a security interest which
covers after-acquired property, the priority otherwise existing under applicable law
and this subsection shall, with respect to such property acquired after the filing of
notice of the lien under section 6321 pursuant to subsection (k), extend only to-
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larged and diminished the protection to future advances and to after-
acquired property proposed by the ABA.94 Of special interest to this
Article, Congress also failed to accept the Committee proposal to add the
following purchase money "superpriority" provision to section 6323:
(o) LIENS AND INTERESTS PREFERRED REGARDLESS OF
TIME.-
The following liens and interests shall ... have priority over the lien
under section 6321 regardless of when such lien arises or notice thereof
is filed ....
(4) *VENDOR'S LIENS AND PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
INTERESTS.-An equitable or statutory vendor's lien upon any
property, or a security interest which is-
(A) Taken or retained by the seller of any property to secure all or
part of its price; or
(B) Taken by any person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the taxpayer to acquire any interest in
the property subject to such security interest, if such value is in fact so
used, and if such person is entitled under applicable law to priority
over preexisting liens against the purchaser.95
This proposed superpriority, explained the Committee Report, would
statutorily recognize the existing deference to purchase money mortgages
(A) Property (including money or rights to money) the acquisition, production
or earning of which was financed, or the surety bond for the production or earning of
which was obtained, upon the security of such security interest;
(B) Property which is attached to and physically becomes an integral part of the
property subject to the security interest; and
(C) Property which is substituted for other property subject to such security
interest, to the extent necessary to maintain unimpaired the value of such security as
of the time when notice of the lien under section 6321 was filed pursuant to subsec-
tion (k), increased in the same ratio as the net amount of any consideration subse-
quently disbursed or delivered, with respect to which the holder of the security
interest is entitled to priority under paragraph (2) of this subsection. If inventory is
acquired or sold or equipment is replaced in the ordinary course of business, it shall
be presumed, unless shown to the contrary, that the full amount of the property or
proceeds so acquired is necessary to maintain unimpaired the value of the security.
Report of the Special Committee, supra note 77, at 685 app.; see also id. at 653, 703-04 app. It
is debatable whether the proposed provision for creditor-financed after-acquired property ad-
ded any more protection than the superpriority for purchase money security interests.
94. The F.T.L.A. did not contain provisions relating to accessions or substitution of col-
lateral, but its provision for after-acquired property was not limited to creditor-financed collat-
eral, as was the ABA draft legislation. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(l)-(2) (1982). The F.T.L.A. provision
did, however, limit the collateral to "commercial financing security" acquired within 45 days
of tax lien filing, id., limitations not found in the ABA draft. The F.T.L.A. provision for
future advances was not on its face limited to obligatory and necessary disbursements, as was
the ABA draft, but it did contain 45-day and actual knowledge limitations not found in the
ABA version. Id. § 6323(c)(2), (d).
95. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 77, at 690-91 app. (discussing tit. I,
§ 6323(o)(4)).
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and expressly counter the mounting body of case law applying the "cho-
ateness" doctrine to defeat consensual vendors' liens.
96
At its midyear meeting on February 23, 1959, the House of Dele-
gates unanimously recommended the adoption of the draft legislation.
The legislation was introduced in Congress in the summer of 1959,97 but
was not enacted into law. The ABA's continuing efforts were highly
touted in the 1966 congressional hearing on the F.T.L.A.9 a The
F.T.L.A. as it finally passed both Houses of Congress, however, diverged
markedly from the specific ABA proposal regarding purchase money se-
curity interests, thus casting doubt on the much-proclaimed legislative
intent to preserve the concept of purchase money priority. 99
The Purchase Money Security Interest Under the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966
Although legislative intent may aid in the construction of an other-
wise ambiguous statute, it is problematic whether such intent can or
should fill the interstices left by failure of a legislative body to fully elabo-
rate its statutory design. This dilemma is faced when considering the
purchase money security interest under the F.T.L.A. Despite its appar-
ent debt to ABA reform efforts and its enactment of several new super-
priorities, 10 0 Congress did not adopt the ABA proposal for a purchase
money superpriority. And, although important indicia of legislative in-
96. The Report stated:
Under general law, a purchase-money mortgage is favored over prior liens existing
against the purchaser, on the theory that all he acquired, to which such liens could
attach, was an encumbered title. Proposed § 6323(o)(4) would apply that rule as
against the federal tax lien, and would extend it also to a statutory or equitable ven-
dor's lien (contrary to the result reached in United States vs. Morrison, which held a
vendor's lien too "inchoate" to prevail even over a subsequent federal tax lien).
Where a third party supplies funds for a purchase of property, and has under state
law the priority of a purchase-money mortgagee, he would enjoy priority against the
tax lien, provided the money is in fact applied on the purchase.
Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
97. The legislation, H.R. 7914 and 7915, was introduced "for purposes of study" by Rep-
resentatives Mills and Simpson in 1959, and was reintroduced in each subsequent session.
House Hearings, supra note 5, at 65 (statement of Laurens Williams, Chairman, ABA Special
Committee on Federal Liens).
98. Id. at 36; see H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 4, at 2; S. REP. No. 1708, supra note 4,
at 2; 112 CONG. REC. 22224 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1966) (statement of Rep. Mills); id. at H28219
(daily ed. Oct. 20, 1966) (statement of Rep. Mills).
99. See infra text accompanying note 106.
100. In addition to the superpriorities for securities and motor vehicles, the Act added
superpriorities governing retail purchases, casual sales, possessory liens, real property taxes
and special assessments, small mechanic's liens, attorney's liens, certain insurance contracts,
and passbook loans. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(3)-(8) (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 4, at
4-7; S. REP. No. 1708, supra note 4, at 4-7.
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tent suggest that Congress considered purchase money priority beyond
question, 10' testimony at the congressional hearings sounded notes of
caution about the effect of the omission of a purchase money superpri-
ority.10 2 The legislative history is thus, at best, inconclusive on the issue
of purchase money priority, and the final legislative product is distinctly
at odds with declarations of congressional intent.
Both the House and Senate Reports of the federal tax lien bill ac-
knowledged that revisions were necessary in order to conform federal tax
lien law to the concepts developed in the U.C.C.103 The bill, it was de-
clared, "substantially improves the status of private sebured credi-
tors."'1 4 In language since prominently cited as preserving purchase
money priority,10 5 House Report No. 1884 stated:
Although so-called purchase money mortgages are not specifically re-
ferred to under present law, it has generally been held that these inter-
ests are protected whenever they arise. This is based upon the concept
that the taxpayer has acquired property or a right to property only to
the extent that the value of the whole property or right exceeds the
amount of the purchase money mortgage. This concept is not affected
by the bill. 10
6
This brief paragraph was Congress' sole concession to the question of
purchase money priority, and House Report's apparent reliance on a re-
tained-title rationale10 7 lacks coherence in light of the immateriality of
title under article 9 of the U.C.C.10 8 Moreover, the House Report's opti-
mistic assessment of the effect, or lack thereof, on existing law of the
omission to spell out purchase money superpriority was not shared by all
witnesses at the congressional hearings. Although the ABA urged pas-
sage of the bill, noting that it embodied many, but not all, of its propos-
als, 109 a prominent member of the ABA Special Committee on Federal
Liens expressed fears about the implications of a provision in the House
101. See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
102. See infra notes 109-12 & accompanying text.
103. H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 4, at 1-3; S. REP. No. 1708, supra note 4, at 1-3.
104. H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 4, at 2; S. REP. No. 1708, supra note 4, at 2; see also
112 CONG. REc. 22209 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1966) (statement of Rep. Trimble); id. at 22225
(daily ed. Sept. 12, 1966) (statement of Rep. Mills). See generally House Hearings, supra note
5, at 36-37 (statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury); id. at 60-66
(statement of Laurens Williams, Chairman, ABA Special Committee on Federal Liens).
105. See infra notes 121, 126-30 & accompanying text.
106. H.R. Rae. No. 1884, supra note 4, at 4. The Senate Report contained the same
language. S. REP. No. 1708, supra note 4, at 4; see also House Hearings, supra note 5, at 48
(statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury).
107. See supra notes 56-58 & accompanying text.
108. See U.C.C. § 9-202 & comment (1978).
109. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 65 (statement of Laurens Williams, Chairman, ABA
Special Committee on Federal Liens).
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bill under study that granted priority to future advances for the comple-
tion of real property purchase or improvement. 0 This provision, it was
argued, could cast doubt on the priority of a purchase money security
interest in personalty arising before or after tax lien filing because only
realty interests were expressly protected."l'
The American Bankers Association voiced similar concern that a
related section of the bill might cast doubt on the general priority of
purchase money interests. Because "it is understood that no such infer-
ence is intended," the Association urged that this be "made clear" by the
addition of the following superpriority provision:
(d) INVALIDITY OF LIEN IN CERTAIN CASES.-Even though notice
of a lien imposed by section 6321 has been filed . . . such liens shall
not be valid-
... (8) PROPERTY SUBJECT To A PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY
INTEREST.-With respect to property subject to a purchase money se-
curity interest, as against a holder of such security interest if under
local law such security interest has priority over preexisting security
interests covering after-acquired property of the purchaser."
2
Despite these warnings, Congress did not include a specific superpri-
ority for purchase money security interests in the F.T.L.A. This exclu-
sion has been deemed a "noteworthy omission." 13 The above-quoted
110. The provision was § 6323(0(3) of original H.B. 11256. See House Hearings, supra
note 5, at 5. Although the provision in this form was not ultimately adopted, the same concern
could flow from the F.T.L.A. provision regarding real property construction or improvement.
See I.R.C. § 6323(c)(3) (1982).
111. STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 89TH CONG., 2D SEss., DIGEST OF
STATEMENTS ON H.B. 11256, at 297 (Comm. Print 1966) (statement of William T. Plumb,
Jr.). The relevant portion of the digest of the statement of Mr. Plumb, a member of the ABA
Special Committee on Federal Liens, reads:
One provision of the bill may be construed as removing the protection which
purchase money interests now enjoy with respect to property acquired by a taxpayer
after notice of a tax lien is filed. The specific reference in the provision granting
certain priorities to a security interest arising before the filing of the tax lien (see sec.
6323(f)(c), p. 10) may cast doubt on the priority of a subsequent (purchase-money)
mortgage (or of a purchase-money security interest in personalty arising before or
after, since only realty interests are protected by (0(3)).
Id.
This concern was shared by Frank R. Kennedy, Professor of Law at the University of
Michigan, whose digested statement reads: "Mr. Kennedy believes that purchase money secur-
ity interests and liens will no longer be accorded any special standing in competition with the
federal tax lien under the bill . . . . Accordingly, he thinks the statute will greatly discourage
sales which are now made pursuant to secured credit arrangements." Id. at 294.
112. House Hearings, supra note 5, at 4, 217 (statement of Kenneth H. Johnson, of the
American Bankers' Association). In particular, the Association was concerned with the lan-
guage of § 6323(f)(2)(B), dealing with obligatory future advances. Id; see id. at 5.
113. Plumb, supra note 7, at 667.
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language of the House Report is used as the primary authority by those
who argue that the concept of purchase money priority survives the
F.T.L.A."14 It has been appropriately described by one court, however,
as an "ambiguous paragraph of legislative history."115 Perhaps not sur-
prisingly, in light of this seemingly authoritative but ambiguous legisla-
tive history, the issue of purchase money priority after the F.T.L.A. has
been largely ignored 1 16 Nevertheless, not all authorities have agreed
that the issue is insignificant, or, indeed, that the marriage of the
F.T.L.A. and pre-existing case law is a happy one. 117 Post-F.T.L.A. ex-
perience suggests that only legislative reform can resolve fully the ambi-
guities inherent in congressional failure to fully address the purchase
money priority question.
The Purchase Money Security Interest After the F.T.L.A.
Following enactment of the F.T.L.A., the purchase money issue re-
ceded into the background, and the government's position on the subject
appeared to be decisive. Case law was sparse, lending credence to the
view that purchase money priority was a settled question. Recent cases,
however, have illustrated that a diversity of views still exists, and have
confirmed the need for uniform, statutory treatment of purchase money
interests.
The Treasury Department's pronouncements on the question of
purchase money priority have been infrequent and unadorned by analyti-
cal detail. In 1960, a General Counsel's opinion,118 citing the United
States v. New Orleans Railroad decision,1 19 quoted with approval from a
recent private letter: "[T]he Internal Revenue Service has, over the years,
consistently recognized the priority of a purchase money mortgage,
notwithstanding the fact that such mortgage was executed and recorded
subsequent to the date of [sic] notice of federal tax lien was filed against
the purchaser-taxpayer."'
20
114. See infra notes 121, 126-30 & accompanying text.
115. First Nat'l Bank of Marlton v. Coxson, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9450, at 84,201,
84,203 (D.N.J. 1976).
116. See infra notes 126-51 & accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 131-32, 175-81 & accompanying text.
118. Op. Gen. Counsel 13-60, [1961] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6307, at 71,157
(Aug. 11, 1960).
119. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 362 (1871); see supra notes 37-38 & accompanying text.
120. Op. Gen. Counsel 13-60, [1961] 7 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) % 6307, at 71,158-
59 (Aug. 11, 1960) (quoting from I.R.S. letter dated July 20, 1960, to Mr. W. J. Driver, Chief
Benefits, Director, Veterans' Administration). The General Counsel's opinion was that the
filed federal tax lien was subordinate to a later purchase money mortgage in realty purchased
from the Veterans' Administration. Id. at 71,157. The opinion did not indicate whether the
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A subsequent Revenue Ruling, relying on the cryptic paragraph
contained in the House Report, tersely summarized the I.R.S. position:
"In view of the legislative history of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966,
the Internal Revenue Service will consider that a purchase money secur-
ity interest or mortgage valid under local law is protected even though it
may arise after a notice of Federal tax lien has been filed."'' 21 Addition-
ally, the Regulations accompanying section 6323, while not directly ad-
dressing the purchase money question, refer to purchase money priority
in one of the examples of the section's applicability to obligatory dis-
bursement agreements.
22
This apparently broad I.R.S. concession to purchase money priority
was exemplified in a 1972 federal district court decision, 123 in which the
assignee of a retail installment contract sued for recovery of insurance
proceeds arising out of the destruction of the subject automobile. The
district court rejected the government's contention that its tax lien, filed
before the retail installment contract was entered into and recorded,
should prevail because plaintiffs "superior lien" was destroyed with the
car.124 Significantly, the government had conceded that, even though its
tax lien was prior in time to the sales transaction, the purchase money
security agreement had priority over the tax lien on the car itself.'
25
This official position may account for the relative paucity of post-
F.T.L.A. cases involving purchase money interests. The position is rein-
mortgage was recorded or unrecorded, but it did assume that the deed to the purchaser and the
purchase money mortgage to the Vetrans' Administration were "substantially simultaneous."
Id.
121. Rev. Rul. 68-57, 1968-1 C.B. 553. Published revenue rulings are "generally binding
upon the I.R.S." [1984] 9 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6005.06, at 67,197. However, the
government's position in later cases, see infra text accompanying notes 133-47, 200-04, belies a
simplistic approach to the effect of Revenue Ruling 68-57.
122. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(c)-3(e) example 1 (1976). The example relates to protection
for obligatory disbursement agreements under §§ 6323(c)(3) and (4), and contains the follow-
ing language:
(ii) Because Z's security interest in H's inventory did not arise under a written agree-
ment entered into before the filing of notice of the first tax lien on December 31,
1968, that lien is superior to Z's security interest except to the extent of Z's purchase
money security interest. Because Z's interest qualifies as a purchase money security
interest with respect to the inventory purchased under the letter of credit, the tax
liens attach under section 6321 only to the equity acquired by H, and the rights of Z
in the inventory so purchased as superior even to the lien filed on December 31, 1968,
without regard to this section.
Id. § 301.6323(C)-3(e)(ii) example 1. Later the example referred to the "greater protection"
enjoyed by the holder of a purchase money security interest. Id. § 301.6323(c)-3(e)(iii).
123. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Empire Mut. Ins. Co., 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9263, at
80,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
124. Id. at 80,519.
125. Id. at 80,519.
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forced by dictum in a 1978 Supreme Court decision, Slodov v. United
States.126 In Slodov, the Court cited House Report No. 1884 and Reve-
nue Ruling 68-57 and declared: "[T]he [Internal Revenue] Code and es-
tablished decisional principles subordinate the tax lien to. . . collateral
which is the subject of a purchase-money mortgage regardless of whether
the agreement was entered into before or after filing of the tax lien."' 127
Slodov's broad validation of purchase money priority, as in the brief
legislative history and I.R.S. pronouncements upon which it relies, is de-
ceptively simple and fails to articulate sufficiently the contours of this
priority. Consistent with the House Report's broad reference to protec-
tion of purchase money interests "whenever they arise,"' 128 this dictum
does furnish some analytical detail: the purchase money mortgage is to
be preferred whether the agreement arises "before or after" the tax lien
filing.12 9 But the Court in Slodov, like Congress and the I.R.S. before it,
failed to address the question of whether and when a purchase money
interest must be perfected to prevail.'
30
An even more problematic aspect of Slodov's reliance on legislative
history is that Congress itself, in its broad and inarticulate treatment of
purchase money priority, relied on a history of case law that was not
sufficiently detailed or concordant to fill the gaps in its legislative scheme.
Some pre-F.T.L.A. federal decisions, for example, allowed the holders of
conditional sales contracts executed before but recorded after tax" lien
126. 436 U.S. 238 (1978). The case involved the liability of a controlling shareholder of
three corporations for unpaid federal taxes withheld from employees' wages under I.R.C.
§ 6672 (1982). The language regarding purchase money security interests and the F.T.L.A.
was dictum in the Court's discussion of I.R.S. collection powers. 436 U.S. at 256-59.
127. 436 U.S. at 257-58. The court reasoned:
Decisional law has long established that a purchase-money mortgagee's interest
in the mortgaged property is superior to antecedent liens prior in time, see United
States v. New Orleans R. Co., 12 Wall. 362 (1871), and, therefore, a federal tax lien is
subordinate to a purchase-money mortgagee's interest notwithstanding that the
agreement is made and the security interest arises after notice of the tax lien. The
purchase-money mortgage priority is based upon recognition that the mortgagee's
interest merely reflects his contribution of property to the taxpayer's estate and there-
fore does not prejudice creditors who are prior in time.
In enacting the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Congress intended to preserve
this priority, H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1966). The IRS has since
formally accepted that position. Rev. Rul. 68-57, 19, 68-1 C. B. 553; see also IRS
General Counsel's Op. No. 13-60, 7 CCH 1961 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 6307 (1960).
Id. at 258 n.23. The dissent complained that all "that the Court is able to offer [in support of
its ruling] is a brief excerpt from the legislative history of an entirely separate statute enacted
some 15 years after the predecessor of § 6672 which, with all respect, has nothing to do with
the question to be decided." Id. at 266 (White, J., dissenting in part).
128. H.R. REP. No. 1884, supra note 4, at 4.
129. 436 U.S. at 257-58.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 182-95.
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filing, or executed without recordation after tax lien filing, to prevail over
the federal tax lien.13 1 Other decisions favored the tax lien over condi-
tional sales contracts executed before, but recorded after, tax lien filing,
while permitting prior unrecorded chattel mortgages to prevail. 132 Thus,
pre-F.T.L.A. decisions varied as to timing, perfection, and nature of the
security device employed. The lack of a uniform rule thus belies the
House Report's asserted reliance on the "concept" of purchase money
priority.
Congressional failure expressly to address the purchase money prob-
lem permits this heritage of conceptual difficulties to carry over to post-
F.T.L.A. analysis, as illustrated in the 1976 case of First National Bank
of Marlton v. Coxson.1 33 In Coxson, the plaintiff bank had loaned money
131. In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wall, 239 F. Supp. 433 (W.D.N.C. 1965),
the court held that the assignee of an unrecorded conditional sales contract for the sale of a
motor vehicle prevailed over previously filed federal tax liens. The court noted that state law
governs the question of whether the taxpayer has any property rights under a conditional sales
contract to which a federal tax lien could attach, whereas federal law governs whether such
property is in fact subject to the lien. Id. at 435. Citing Planter's Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
South Carolina Ins. Co., 263 N.C. 32, 138 S.E.2d 812 (1964), the court reasoned that a tax-
payer/purchaser did not have a property right in the vehicle to which the federal tax lien could
attach. The failure to record did not affect this result, because the recording laws were in-
tended to protect subsequent, rather than prior, creditors and purchasers. General Motors, 239
F. Supp. at 435. Moreover, the government was "unable to show a detrimental change in its
position" due to the failure of the holder of the conditional sales contract to record. Id. (citing
United States v. Anders Contracting Co., 111 F. Supp. 700, 704 (W.D.S.C. 1952)). In Anders,
the court reached a similar conclusion, reasoning that the taxpayer's rights in the car "were
qualified and limited by the terms of the retention title contract," 111 F. Supp. at 702, and that
the government had suffered no loss by the failure to record. Id. at 704. Indeed, the court
observed that to rule in favor of the government would result in "unjust enrichment" under
the facts of this case. Id.
Plumb observes that "[miost of the decisions under prior law held perfection unnecessary
as against the federal tax lien, whether the vendor's interest was a retained title or a commer-
cial security interest, and whether the federal lien arose before or after the transaction."
Plumb, supra note 7, at 668 (citing Gauvey v. United States, 291 F.2d 42, 47 (8th Cir. 1961);
General Motors, 239 F. Supp. 433; United States v. Lebanon Woolen Mills, 241 F. Supp. 393,
397 (D.N.H. 1964); Anders, 111 F. Supp. at 704; Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 263 N.C 32,
138 S.E.2d 812).
132. In Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1961), the Tenth
Circuit held that a conditional sales agreement (which the court also termed a "purchase
money chattel mortgage"), executed before, but recorded after, tax lien filing, was inferior to
the federal tax lien. Id. at 116, 118; cf Gauvey v. Basin Rig & Trucking, 185 F. Supp. 374 (D.
N.D. 1960), in which the court held that the federal tax lien was superior to a conditional sales
contract executed before, but filed after, tax lien filing, reasoning that the contract was not a
"mortgage" within the meaning of § 6323. Id. at 377. The court held that the federal tax lien
was inferior, however, to a chattel mortgage executed before and filed after tax lien filing,
reasoning that there was no requirement in § 6323 that the mortgage be filed. Id. The court
distinguished Anders on the basis of state law, id. at 379-80, urging the distinction "in this
state" between a conditional sales contract and a chattel mortgage. Id. at 380.
133. 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9450, at 84,201 (D.N.J. 1976).
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to the individual defendant for purchase of an automobile. The bank
obtained a purchase money security interest in the automobile on March
6, 1972. On March 7, the government filed its federal tax lien. The bank
perfected its interest on May 9. The government seized and sold the car,
and this action was commenced for recovery of the proceeds. 134
The federal district court, using a circuitous and questionable legal
analysis, granted the government's motion for summary judgment. 135
The government argued that the purchase money security interest must
meet the section 6323(h)(1) definition of security interest to prevail, and
that the bank was not entitled to the protection of that section because its
security interest was not perfected at the time of the federal tax lien fil-
ing.136 The bank argued that Revenue Ruling 68-57 had changed the
meaning of section 6323 to allow even unperfected purchase money se-
curity interests to prevail over the federal tax lien. 137 The court deemed
the bank's argument "entirely without merit" and termed Reveue Ruling
68-57 "a rather vague statement of policy based upon an ambiguous par-
agraph of legislative history." 138
Rather than excepting the purchase money security interest from
the express provisions of the F.T.L.A., the court appeared to use a
straight statutory analysis in determining whether this interest had prior-
ity. An administrative agency cannot rewrite or overrule an act of Con-
gress, the court declared, and the language of section 6323 clearly
indicates that only perfected security interests are entitled to priority.139
Furthermore, a primary purpose of the F.T.L.A. was to reconcile federal
tax lien law with the U.C.C., and the F.T.L.A. "failed to mention" a
"very important" security interest: the purchase money security
interest. 140
The court's analysis then became somewhat murky because it fo-
134. Id. at 84,202.
135. Id. at 84,205.
136. Id. at 84,202.
137. Id. at 84,203.
138. Id. The court further explained:
Although revenue rulings are entitled to great weight as opinions of a government
agency possessing experience and expertise in the administration of the federal tax
laws, it should not be forgotten that an administrative agency has no power to re-
write or overrule an Act of Congress. If there are two possible interpretations of a
revenue ruling, one of which conflicts with the language and policy of the statute and
one of which is consonant with it, the latter should be adopted by a reviewing court.
Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 84,203-04. The court cited the superpriority provisions of § 6323(b) as an ex-
ample of a "clear statutory direction" on the question of subordination of the federal tax lien.
Id. at 84,203 n. .
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cused on U.C.C. section 9-312(4) as an apparent aid to construction.1 4 '
Section 9-312(4) contains a priority rule governing competing security
interests in collateral other than inventory, and provides that a purchase
money security interest will prevail if perfected at or within ten days of
the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral. 142 The court did
not explain its application of section 9-312(4) to the priority contest be-
tween the federal tax lien and a purchase money interest, and it seems
that an analogy to section 9-301(2) would have been more appropriate.
The latter section permits a previously unperfected purchase money se-
curity interest to prevail over an intervening lien creditor if the secured
party files a financing statement before or within ten days after the debtor
receives possession. 143 Because the F.T.L.A.'s definition of "security in-
terest" requires that the interest be "protected under local law against a
subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation,'" 144 gen-
erally thought to mean the U.C.C. "lien creditor,"' 45 a section 9-301(2)
analysis would have more effectively supported the court's reasoning.
Juxtaposing Revenue Ruling 68-57 and the ten-day perfection rule
of 9-312(4), the court concluded that the I.R.S. will consider a post-filing
purchase money security interest superior to the federal tax lien if per-
fected within ten days of the debtor's possession. 46 The Revenue Ruling
was therefore inapplicable to entitle the bank's untimely filed purchase
money security interest to priority under section 6323(a).
47
If the court's rationale sometimes lacked clarity, its view of the im-
port of legislative history did not. The court described the actual mean-
ing of House Report No. 1884 as "quite vague,"' 48 noting that the
Report did not specify the type of protection it intended to give purchase
money security interests. The court then substantiated the fears of those
early witnesses at the congressional hearings who had urged that omis-
sion of an express purchase money provision could be viewed as evidence
of legislative intent on the priority question: 4 9 "[I]t seems clear that
Congress did not intend to make all purchase money security interests
141. Id. at 84,204.
142. U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1978); see supra note 47.
143. U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1978); see supra note 51. Note that § 9-301(2) refers to filing,
whereas § 9-312(4) refers to perfection generally.
144. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1982).
145. See supra note 15.
146. Coxson, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84,204-05.
147. Id. at 84,205. The court noted that "since the Revenue Ruling is inapplicable in this
case, this Court need not consider whether the Ruling itself is a valid act of agency interpreta-
tion or an invalid act of agency amendment . Id. at 84,204 n.2.
148. Id. at 84,204.
149. See supra notes 109-12 & accompanying text.
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superior to all federal tax liens, because purchase money security interest
are not entitled to 'super priority' under any of the carefully defined cate-
gories of sections 6323(b) and (c)." 150
The Coxson case vividly illustrates that supportive legislative his-
tory, I.R.S. concessions, and the scarcity of post-F.T.L.A. case law may
have lulled proponents of purchase money priority into a false sense of
security. 151 It demonstrates that the government will not always concede
priority to purchase money security interests, nor will all courts be im-
pressed by a brief paragraph in House Report No. 1884 or the broad,
undefined position of Revenue Ruling 68-57. The Coxson decision also
highlights the still extant analytical complexities affecting purchase
money priority. According to the court, purchase money security inter-
ests, are, like other security interests, subject to the provisions of the
F.T.L.A. up to a certain point; but the unique nature of the purchase
money security interest within the U.C.C., and the non-binding but per-
suasive impact of legislative history and administrative pronouncements
may exert special pressures on judicial construction of the federal tax lien
provisions. It is apparent that many interpretative problems remain con-
cerning purchase money priority under the F.T.L.A. that must be identi-
fied and addressed to avoid other, Coxson-type decisions.
150. Coxson, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCI-) at 84,204 (emphasis in orginal). The court also
noted that "purchase money security interests are mentioned in the House Report only in the
context of the conditional privilege rules of § 6323(a), rather than in the 'super priority' rules
of § 6323(b) and (c)." Id.
151. See also L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Foley, 341 F. Supp. 810 (W.D.N.Y. 1972), in which the
court held that an unperfected conditional vendor was subordinate to a subsequently filed tax
lien. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that he should prevail as a conditional vendor,
despite his unperfected status, reasoning that title is "largely immaterial" under the U.C.C., id.
at 813, and the taxpayer/vendee's rights were sufficient for the attachment of the federal tax
lien. Id. at 814.
A different result was reached in the case of Minix v. Maggard, 652 S.W.2d 93 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1983), which held that an unrecorded purchase money real estate mortgage was superior
to a later-filed federal tax lien. The court noted that "[n]either mortgages, purchase money
mortgages nor mortgage liens are addressed by the Code," but were included in the term
"security interest" under the F.T.L.A. Id. at 96. Under Kentucky law, the unrecorded
purchase money mortgage was protected against any subsequent creditor with knowledge, and
hence was a "security interest" within the meaning of § 6323(h). Id. The court cited Revenue
Ruling 68-57 in support of its position, and concluded: "Purchase money liens are extraordi-
nary, they arise when the vendor parts with legal title but retains a security interest. Although
we find no case discussing this point, we believe that section [6323(h)] defining state protected
interests was designed to protect precisely this type of lien." Id. at 97. The problem of real
estate purchase money priority poses somewhat different considerations, but the Minix court's
reliance on Revenue Ruling 68-75 and its broad reading of the term "security interests" is a
suggestive contrast to the more conservative approach of the Coxson court.
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Current Issues Affecting Purchase Money Priority
As demonstrated from the foregoing discussion, there is considera-
ble authoritative support for a general policy preferring purchase money
interests, but very little authority to define and direct the application of
that policy. There are several issues of continuing concern that should be
carefully scrutinized in order to elucidate the question of purchase
money priority. Among these are the basic relationship of purchase
money security interests to the F.T.L.A., the definition of these interests,
and the effects of non-perfection and actual knowledge on the issue of
priority.
The Relationship of Purchase Money Security Interests to the F.T.L.A.
One of the analytical problems left unresolved by Congressional fail-
ure to enact a purchase money superpriority is the fundamental relation-
ship of purchase money security interests to the present statutory scheme
of the F.T.L.A. Two positions deserve consideration. Under one view,
purchase money interests are security interests like all others in the
F.T.L.A. and should be treated accordingly. An alternative position is
that such interests fall outside of the statutory scheme of the F.T.L.A.
and should be given their own distinct set of rules.
Many persuasive reasons support the first position advocating indis-
tinct treatment of all security interests. Most compelling is the fact that
the F.T.L.A. itself makes no distinction between purchase money and
non-purchase money security interests. Section 6323(a) purports to pro-
tect the "holder of a security interest" against unfiled tax liens,' 52 and
section 6323(h)(1) makes no definitional distinction between purchase
money and non-purchase money security interests.1 53 On its face, the
F.T.L.A. contains no provision referring to, much less preferring, pur-
chase money security interests. This omission is even more striking in
light of the list of "superpriorities" in section 6323(b).154 If Congress
indeed had intended to incorporate purchase money priority into the
F.T.L.A., it is inexplicable why it did not do so through an express super-
priority provision such as that proposed in early draft legislation. 55
There are also several policy considerations that favor treating
purchase money security interests like all other security interests under
152. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1982); see supra notes 13-15 & accompanying text.
153. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1982).
154. Id. § 6323(b); see supra notes 71, 100 & accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 95-96, 112 & accompanying text. This point was forcibly raised in
Coxson, see supra notes 139-40 & accompanying text, in realization of concerns voiced at
F.T.L.A. congressional hearings. See supra notes 110-12 & accompanying text.
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the F.T.L.A. First, the policies of clarity, predictability and uniformity,
so important in the U.C.C.,156 are decidedly advanced by treating all se-
curity interests alike. Conceptual and analytical difficulties, such as
those encountered in Coxson, would be eliminated by a uniform rule.
157
Moreover, a purchase money secured party has the same opportunity as
other creditors to discover the federal tax lien filing and protect itself
accordingly. There is arguably no compelling reason why all creditors
should not be placed on notice of a possible loss of their security once a
tax lien is filed.
Second, policies of equity and fairness support identical treatment of
all security interests, as illustrated in the case of a floating lienor. Under
section 6323(c) of the present statutory scheme, a perfected, secured
"floating lien" creditor can prevail over a subsequently filed tax lien only
to a limited extent: a58 by collateral acquired by the debtor/taxpayer and
advances made without knowledge within forty-five days after tax lien
filing. 159 The priority in after-acquired property is further limited by the
requirement that the collateral constitute "commercial financing secur-
ity," a category that includes only commercial paper, accounts receiva-
ble, inventory, and real property mortgages. 16° A floating lienor may be
engaged in a continuing financing relationship with the debtor/taxpayer,
and its future advances may go to purchase some or all of the after-ac-
quired collateral. But if these future advances are pursuant to a pre-tax
lien filing security agreement, it appears that the secured party is bound
by the time and definitional limitations of section 6323(c). No such re-
strictions would govern a post-tax lien filing purchase money secured
party if accorded separate treatment, even though its advances were simi-
lar in scope and use to those of the pre-filing floating lienor. 161 The line
separating a pre-filing floating lienor and a post-filing purchase money
secured party is often indistinct; to subject these parties to different prior-
ity rules may be inequitable.1
62
156. See U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1978); id. § 1-102 comment 1.
157. Shortly after the enactment of the F.T.L.A. one scholar urged: "It is at least an argu-
able theory that no security interest takes priority over the tax lien except as specified in sec-
tion 6323-that the statute does not refer by implication to any local law of priority." Young,
Priority of the Federal Tax Lien, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 749 (1967) (emphasis in original).
158. See supra notes 26-28 & accompanying text.
159. I.R.C. § 6323(c)(2) (1982); cf id. § 6323(d) (45-day period for making disbursements
without knowledge).
160. Id. § 6323(c)(2)(C).
161. Of course, the floating lienor could execute a new, post-tax lien filing security agree-
ment for the new advance, and if this security interest falls within the definitional requirements
of U.C.C. § 9-107, it would qualify as a purchase money secured creditor.
162. Related to the purchase money question is the problem of work in progress or substi-
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Finally, the purchase money security interest does not always re-
ceive superior treatment under the U.C.C. For example, the priority
provisions governing competing secured parties, sections 9-312(3) and
(4), seek to balance the interests of all creditors, and certain limitations
are placed on the extent and conditions of purchase money priority.
Hence, the U.C.C. itself acknowledges that competing interests may pre-
clude a completely inviolable purchase money priority.
163
There are equally valid and persuasive reasons supporting distinct
and preferred treatment of purchase money security interests. As previ-
ously indicated, pre-F.T.L.A. case law and legislative history support
such treatment.164 This history impressed the Supreme Court in Slodov,
but not the federal district court in Coxson. 165 Further, the I.R.S. has
adopted this position, and there have not been cases strongly challenging
the policy of preferred treatment. Therefore, advocating the first posi-
tion, so strongly opposed to established authority, is unwarranted in light
of this official support of preferred treatment.
The purpose and policy of the F.T.L.A. also support distinct treat-
ment of purchase money interests. The stated purpose of the F.T.L.A.
was to conform to changes made by the U.C.C.,166 and the U.C.C. decid-
edly favors purhase money security interests.' 67 Under certain circum-
stances, the U.C.C. allows a purchase money security interest to prevail
even over a prior, perfected secured party with an after-acquired prop-
erty interest. 168 This helps to counter the equitable argument that all
secured parties should be treated alike under F.T.L.A. And any per-
ceived unfairness stemming from the tenuous conceptual line between a
post-filing purchase money secured party and a floating lien financer
could be remedied by the execution of a new, post-tax lien security agree-
ment for any new advance by the floating lienor. If this security interest
tution of collateral. This situation was addressed in the ABA draft legislation, see supra note
93, but was not adopted by the F.T.L.A. Coogan acknowledges that "[t]he purchase-money
route may not be open where [a lender] adds value not by getting new goods but by paying for
processing goods already owned. Because he knows of the tax filing, he can make no further
advances except on a basis subordinate to the tax filing." LB U.C.C. SERV. (MB) § 12B.08[2]
(1984). Coogan suggests that in such a situation, the government may be willing to
subordinate its tax lien under § 6325(d)(2) if the advance would considerably enhance the
value of the work in progress. Id. § 12B-91.
163. See U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3 (1978).
164. See supra notes 36-39, 56-106 & accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 126-50 & accompanying text.
166. See supra note 4.
167. See supra notes 40-55 & accompanying text.
168. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4) (1978).
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otherwise falls within the definitional requirements of U.C.C. section 9-
107, it would qualify as a purchase money security interest.
The F.T.L.A. itself contains provisions that, by analogy, support
distinct treatment of purchase money security interests. For example,
some of the "superpriorities" of section 6323(b) are intended to protect
persons who have improved or enhanced the taxpayer's estate, such as
the provisions shielding holders of possessory liens for the repair or im-
provement of personal property 169 and certain mechanic's lienors.
170
This preference for interests enhancing the taxpayer's estate is also evi-
denced in section 6323(c)(3), relating to construction or improvement of
real property and the raising of crops or livestock.
171
An important policy behind these preferences and the general policy
169. Section 6323(b)(5) provides:
(b) Protection for certain interests even though notice filed
Even though notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 has been fied, such lien shall
not be valid-
(5) Personal property subject to possessory lien
With respect to tangible personal property subject to a lien under local law securing
the reasonable price of the repair or improvement of such property, as against a
holder of such a lien, if such holder is, and has been, continuously in possession of
such property from the time such lien arose.
I.R.C. § 6323(b)(5) (1982).
170. This subsection provides that the tax lien is not valid
[w]ith respect to real property subject to a lien for repair or improvement of a per-
sonal residence (containing not more than four dwelling units) occupied by the
owner of such residence, as against a mechanic's lienor, but only if the contract price
on the contract with the owner is not more than $1,000.
Id. § 6323(b)(7); cf id § 6323(a) (protection for mechanic's lienors).
171. That section provides:
(3) Real property construction or improvement financing agreement
For purposes of this subsection-
(A) Definition
The term "real property construction or improvement financing agreement" means
an agreement to make cash disbursements to finance-
(i) the construction or improvement of real property,
(ii) a contract to construct or improve real property, or
(iii) the raising or harvesting of a farm crop or the raising of livestock or other
animals.
For purposes of clause (iii), the furnishing of goods and services shall be treated as
the disbursement of cash.
(B) Limitation on qualified property
The term "qualified property", when used with respect to a real property construc-
tion or improvement financing agreement, includes only-
(i) in the case of subparagraph (A)(i), the real property with respect to which
the construction or improvement has been or is to be made,
(ii) in the case of subparagraph (A)(ii), the proceeds of the contract described
therein, and
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favoring purchase money interests is that such interests advance, im-
prove, and enhance the estate. As such, they are to be encouraged, and a
creditor is far less likely to loan money or sell goods on credit if it is not
given priority in the resulting collateral. 172 Conversely, the government
is a non-reliance creditor and would be unjustly enriched by the appro-
priation of purchase money property.1 73 The frequently-cited policies
supporting purchase money priority thus have continuing vitality, de-
spite the U.C.C.'s neutrality on the question of title, because the underly-
ing rationale for such priority is the character of the purchase money
creditor's contribution to the debtor's estate.
174
On balance, the reasons favoring some form of purchase money pri-
ority outweigh those opposing such distinct treatment. Consequently,
even in the absence of an express statutory provision, any analysis of
priority problems under the F.T.L.A. should begin with the basic propo-
sition that purchase money security interests are entitled to some addi-
tional measure of protection against the federal tax lien. The perimeters
of this preference, however, can be addressed with finality only by the
addition of a statutory superpriority.
Definition of Qualifying Purchase Money Interests
Another by-product of Congressional failure to articulate the con-
tours of purchase money priority is the unresolved question of the types
of purchase money interests entitled to qualify for preferential treatment.
One aspect of this issue is fundamental to the proper construction of sec-
tion 9-107's definition of a purchase money security interest; other as-
pects are peculiar to the purchase money problem under the F.T.L.A.
A prominent example of the latter problem was suggested by a
scholarly critic shortly after the enactment of the F.T.L.A. This com-
mentator attempted to reconcile House Report No. 1884 with the direc-
tives of section 6323 by arguing that purchase money priority was
available for sellers only. If purchase money lenders were left out of the
picture, he contended, then the drafting was "fairly defensible" in light of
the House Report's reliance on the concept of retained property inter-
(iii) in the case of subparagraph (A)(iii), property subject to the lien imposed by
section 6321 at the time of tax lien filing and the crop or the livestock or other
animals referred to in subparagraph (A)(iii).
Id. § 6323(c)(3).
172. See supra note 59 & accompanying text.
173. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Wall, 239 F. Supp. 433, 435 (W.D.N.C.
1965); United States v. Anders Contracting Co., Il1 F. Supp. 700, 704 (W.D.S.C. 1953).
174. See supra notes 56-58 & accompanying text.
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ests. 175 The seller/lender dichotomy was partially vindicated by the
ABA superpriority proposal, which appeared to excuse perfection only
for post-tax lien filing sellers. 176 This position, however, since deemed a
"narrow construction" of House Report No. 1884,177 is directly refuted
by the U.C.C.'s definition of purchase money security interest to include
both sellers and lenders. It nevertheless exemplifies, in exaggerated form,
the definitional problems under the present statutory scheme.
Perhaps a more important and practical definitional problem relates
to the time of attachment of the security interest. A prominent authority
and member of the ABA Special Committee on Federal Liens, William
Plumb, has suggested that the seller/lender dichotomy is not significant,
at least if the interest "attaches simultaneously with the purchase so that
only an encumbered title is acquired."' 178 The problem arises if state law
views a non-simultaneous attachment as part of the same transaction,
thus conferring purchase money status. Plumb argues that this may then
go beyond the concept adopted by House Report No. 1884 "and may be
vulnerable to the argument that, once the taxpayer has acquired a prop-
erty right, the question of priority of liens thereon is to be determined
solely by federal law."'
179
Plumb's view of simultaneous attachment derives some support
from section 6323(h)(1), which includes in its definition of "security in-
terest" a requirement that "the holder has parted with money or money's
worth." 180 This requirement appears to eliminate from preferred treat-
ment the secured party whose security agreement is signed and financing
statement fied before tax lien filing, but whose first advance is made sub-
sequent to tax lien filing. If purchase money security interests are other-
wise exempt from the constraints on security interests, it seems
reasonable to adopt the conservative definitional approach urged by
Plumb. Thus, for example, a lender whose loan was made three months
before the signing of a security agreement may lack the necessary simul-
taneity for purposes of preference under the F.T.L.A. 18' While the en-
actment of an express purchase money superpriority would not displace
the issue of simultaneity, the question should be decided by the same
175. Young, supra note 157, at 751.
176. See supra text accompanying note 95.
177. Plumb, supra note 7, at 667 n.380.
178. Id. at 668.
179. Id.
180. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1)(B) (1982).
181. See also Op. Gen. Counsel 13-60, [1961] 7 STAND FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 6307, at
71,157, 71,159 (Aug. 11, 1960), in which the simultaneity of the transaction was an important
element of the recognition of purchase money priority.
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state-law forum that determines the existence of a purchase money secur-
ity interest within the meaning of U.C.C. section 9-107, thus avoiding the
potential definitional gap resulting from the ambiguity of the concept ap-
proved in House Report No. 1884.
Perfection vs. Non-Perfection
Perhaps the most pervasive problem in considering purchase money
priority is whether the purchase money security interest must be per-
fected to prevail over the federal tax lien. If a purchase money interest is
held to the same standards governing other security interests under the
F.T.L.A., then it is clear that this security interest must be "protected
under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an un-
secured obligation"' 82 (i.e., perfected) in order to prevail over a subse-
quently filed tax lien. If, however, a purchase money interest is accorded
distinct and preferred treatment, particularly on the theory that the col-
lateral acquired is not "property belonging to a taxpayer,"1 83 there is no
reason to require perfection, regardless of whether the interest arose
before or after tax lien filing. Moreover, the government, as a non-reli-
ance creditor, would not be adversely affected by the fact of non-perfec-
tion. This position was supported by several pre-F.T.L.A. decisions,
which held that even unperfected purchase money interests, including
both retained title and commercial security interests, prevailed over ante-
cedent or subsequent federal tax liens.
184
House Report No. 1884 appears to offer some support for the non-
perfection position by citing with approbation the preference for
purchase money interests "whenever they arise,"' 85 without premising
this priority on perfection. The Report noted that the bill did not affect
the "concept" that a taxpayer can acquire property "only to the extent
that the value of the whole property . . . exceeds the amount of the
purchase money mortgage."'186 This conceptual limitation on title would
be unaffected by perfection or non-perfection of the interest, and the case
law on which this "concept" was based often held perfection
irrelevant. 
87
Subsequent I.R.S. pronouncements have done little to clarify the
perfection question. Revenue Ruling 68-57 makes no mention of perfec-
182. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1982).
183. See supra notes 56-58 & accompanying text.
184. See supra note 131.
185. H.R. Rep. No. 1884, supra note 4, at 4.
186. Id.
187. See supra note 131.
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tion, stating only that the I.R.S. "will consider that a purchase money
security interest valid under local law is protected"18 8 even though aris-
ing after tax lien filing. A security interest can be "valid under local law"
without perfection,1 89 and the bare language of Revenue Ruling 68-57
may arguably support the priority of valid, though unperfected, purchase
money interests. The superficiality and brevity of the language, however,
suggest that such a result would be inadvertent at best. The Treasury
Regulations offer no clarification, making only brief mention of purchase
money priority without specifying the effect of non-perfection. 190
In his article published shortly after the enactment of the F.T.L.A.,
Plumb noted the strong argument in favor of unperfected purchase
money priority. This argument garnered support from congressional
failure to enact a specific purchase money priority, thus rendering the
F.T.L.A. definition of security interest irrelevant to the purchase money
question:
Since Congress elected to view purchase money interests, not as "se-
curity interests" enjoying superpriority by federal law, but as encum-
brances limiting the property-right which the taxpayer acquires and to
which the federal tax lien may attach, there may still be vitality in the
earlier decisions holding that a purchase money security interest which
is good against the taxpayer purchaser himself is good against the fed-
eral tax lien, whether the latter attaches before or after the
purchase. 19
Despite the persuasiveness of this argument, post-F.T.L.A. cases in-
dicate that perfection of a purchase money security is, indeed, critical to
its priority. The government concession in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Em-
188. Rev. Rul. 68-57, 1968-1 C.B. 553 (emphasis added).
189. Section 9-203 of the U.C.C. provides that a security interest attaches and becomes
enforceable when:
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or
the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collat-
eral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops growing or to be grown
or timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned;
(b) value has been given; and
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-203 (1978). Presumably, the security interest would be "valid under local law,"
within the meaning of Revenue Ruling 68-57 when these § 9-203 elements have been satisfied.
190. Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(c)-3(e) example 1 (1976).
191. Plumb, supra note 7, at 669. Plumb adds:
If, as a matter of policy, Congress believes the federal tax collector should always be
treated as a reliance creditor, then this gap in the statute should be closed by requir-
ing that purchase money security interests be perfected within the period prescribed
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pire Mutual Insurance92 involved a purchase money security interest ob-
tained and perfected after the tax lien-filing.193 Coxson imposed a ten-
day from possession perfection rule, by analogy to U.C.C. section 9-
312(4), in the case of a purchase money security interest obtained before,
but perfected after, tax lien filing.' 94 And other recent federal district
court decisions have denied priority to the holder of a security interest
obtained but not properly perfected before tax lien filing. 
95
As these cases illustrate, the more liberal approach to purchase
money interests endorsed by pre-F.T.L.A. decisions and suggested by the
Act's legislative history has been largely rejected. Although the cases do
not enunciate the reasons for requiring perfection, there appears to be an
unarticulated assumption that the F.T.L.A. definition of security interest
should be the point of departure-if not the point of destination-for
analysis of purchase money priority. This position derives support from
the simplicity and ease of perfection under the U.C.C. But as long as the
question is left for judicial resolution, it will be difficult to predict with
certainty the effect of non-perfection on purchase money priority.
The Effect of Actual Knowledge
A final issue left unresolved by the present statutory scheme is the
effect of actual knowledge on purchase money priority. Should it change
the priority result if a purchase money secured party has actual knowl-
edge of a filed tax lien, or, conversely, if the government has actual
knowledge of a prior, unperfected purchase money security interest?
Actual knowledge plays a limited role under the F.T.L.A. Several
superpriorities contain an actual knowledge condition, including provi-
sions protecting the purchaser of securities without actual knowledge of
the tax lien.' 96 Actual knowledge will shorten the post-filing period
within which future advances may be made with priority. 97 But con-
structive, rather than actual, notice is the rule of section 6323(a), when
the act of tax lien filing validates the lien against purchasers, security
192. 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9263, at 80,517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
193. See id. at 80,518; supra notes 123-25 & accompanying text.
194. First Nat'l Bank of Marlton v. Coxson, 76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9450, at 84,201,
84,204 (D.N.J. 1976).
195. Fred Kraus & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ind.) (improperly
perfected security interest subject to later-filed tax lien), affid, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974);
L.B. Smith, Inc. v. Foley, 341 F. Supp. 810 (W.D.N.Y. 1972) (unperfected conditional vendor
subordinate to subsequently filed tax lien); see infra notes 200-04 & accompanying text.
196. I.R.C. § 6323(b)(1) (1982).
197. Id. § 6323(c)(2)(A), (d).
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interests, mechanic's liens, and judgment liens. 198
Nothing in the F.T.L.A. or its legislative history appears to support
an actual knowledge exception to purchase money priority. The policies
underlying this priority, such as the enhancement of the taxpayer's estate
and the non-reliance character of the government, tend to favor the
purchase money secured party regardless of its knowledge. And the
U.C.C., while subjecting purchase money priority over competing secur-
ity interests to certain conditions under sections 9-312(3) and (4), does
not premise that priority on lack of actual knowledge. 199 Hence, if a
purchase money security interest is otherwise entitled to priority, the
holder's knowledge should be irrelevant.
Whether the government's actual knowledge of a prior, unperfected
security interest should affect its priority was considered in the 1974 case
of Fred Kraus & Sons, Inc. v. United States.2°° The plaintiff in Kraus
argued that the government's knowledge should subordinate the federal
tax lien to its purchase money security interest.20 1 The court responded
that, under certain circumstances, a judgment lien creditor with knowl-
edge was subordinate to an unperfected security interest under the
U.C.C.2°2 The court refused to decide the case on this point, however,
declaring that this security interest had to meet the threshold require-
ments of section 6323(a) to obtain priority.203 The plaintiff's interest was
not properly perfected, and so failed to meet the definitional standards of
198. Id. § 6323(a).
199. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4) (1978).
200. 369 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Ind.), affld mem., 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974). In Kraus,
a retail sales contract for the sale of certain fixtures and equipment was entered into and a
security interest obtained before the filing of the first federal tax lien. The holder of the secur-
ity interest then filed a financing statement in the wrong office after the filing of the first federal
tax lien and before the filing of a second federal tax lien. Id. at 1090-91.
201. Id. at 1092.
202. Id. (citing U.C.C. §§ 9-301(I)(d), 9-401(2) (1978)). Section 9-301(1)(d), however,
does not govern the priority of a lien creditor. See infra note 205.
203. The court stated:
This court is of the opinion that even though the plaintiff's lien would have been
entitled to priority against a party who had notice of its existence, or its contents, this
is only sufficient for state purposes. The federal test to be applied to determine the
existence of a security interest sufficient to claim protection under Section 6323 must
be met. Section 6323(h) does not make the priority of the federal lien depend on
whether a judgment lien did, in fact, exist which had priority over a security interest.
Rather, the statute prescribes the degree to which a security interest must be per-
fected, i.e., sufficient action must have been taken by the secured party to perfect his
security interest as to all hypothetical judgment lien creditors.
369 F. Supp. at 1093. The court had also noted that the government's knowledge had accrued
after the filing of the second tax lien, possibly rendering the plaintiff's claim moot, but declined
to decide the case on this point. Id. at 1092.
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a security interest under the F.T.L.A.20 4
The Kraus court thus appears to have rejected the argument that the
government's actual knowledge should affect priority, a position that de-
rives no apparent support from legislative history or provisions of the
F.T.L.A. While the U.C.C. does under limited circumstances permit ac-
tual knowledge to affect priority, 20 5 none of the circumstances apply to
the facts of Kraus. A line of cases subordinating the government with
actual knowledge to an unperfected pre-tax lien filing security interest
20 6
is inapposite because the 1972 Official Text of U.C.C section 9-301(l)(b)
made a lien creditor's knowledge of the security interest immaterial.
20 7
Actual knowledge does not subvert the filed tax lien under section
6323(a), and there appears to be no persuasive policy reason to do so. If
a purchase money security interest is entitled to priority in a Kraus-type
situation, it should be because of its status, albeit unperfected, rather
than the factual question of knowledge. Here, too, the enactment of a
purchase money superpriority would eliminate the ambiguity by super-
imposing purchase money priority onto the existing statutory scheme of
the F.T.L.A., in which actual knowledge is irrelevant.
204. The plaintiff had filed its financing statement in the wrong office, id. at 1091-92, and
hence its security interest was not properly perfected under state law. Id. at 1093. It was not,
therefore, a holder of a "security interest" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1982);
cf. Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1961) (court rejected plain-
tiff's contention that the government had such notice of the additional sales contract as to
abrogate its priority pursuant to Colorado statute, ruling that the plaintiff had not sustained its
burden of proof establishing such notice).
205. Section 9-301(l)(c) subordinates an unperfected security interest to the rights of a
transferee in bulk or other buyer not in the ordinary course of business, or a buyer of farm
products in the ordinary course, if value is given and delivery of the collateral received "with-
out knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c) (1978).
Section 9-301(4) provides that a person who becomes a lien creditor while a security interest is
perfected takes subject to advances made before he becomes a lien creditor or within 45 days
thereafter "or made without knowledge of the lien." Id. § 9-301(4). Section 9-307(3) provides
that a non-ordinary course buyer takes free of future advances "made after the secured party
acquires knowledge of the purchase, or more than 45 days after the purchase, whichever first
occurs .... " Id. § 9-307(3). Section 9-401(2) provides that a good faith filing of a financing
statement in an improper place is effective "against any person who has knowledge of the
contents of such financing statement." Id. § 9-401(2).
206. See Dragstrem v. Obermeyer, 549 F.2d 20, 25 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1977); Borg-Warner
Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Prestonburg, 577 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Ky. 1979).
207. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1978). The 1962 Official Text provided that an unperfected
security interest was subordinate to "a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge
of the security interest and before it is perfected." U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1962) (emphasis ad-
ded). The 1972 Official Text deleted the knowledge requirement, noting in the "Reasons for
1972 Change" that it was "completely inconsistent in spirit with the rules of priority between
security interests, where knowledge plays a very minor role." U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) reasons for
1972 change (1972).
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A Proposal for Legislative Change
The foregoing analysis illustrates that the "tortured meanderings"
of federal tax lien law have become even more agonizingly circuitous in
the area of purchase money priority. The gridlock created by pre-
F.T.L.A. case law, legislative history, I.R.S. pronouncements, and the
few post-F.T.L.A. decisions has only served to postpone resolution of the
purchase money question. In the absence of a specific statutory directive,
courts considering the issue today can reasonably rely on indicia of legis-
lative intent to prefer purchase money security interests. But the con-
tours of the preference are obscure, and the results may differ markedly
in analysis and outcome.
The author suggests that, in the absence of statute, a court should
subject the pre-tax lien purchase money security interest to the same test
for priority as other security interests. The section 6323(h)(1) require-
ments of perfection and consideration in "money or money's worth" 20 8
are non-rigorous and easy to ascertain. The act of perfection gives notice
to third parties of the secured party's claim, thus lessening the opportu-
nity for fraudulent or mistaken duplication of security and encouraging
more informed financial planning. As such, there should be incentives
for its employment by purchase money and non-purchase money secured
interests alike in the period before tax lien filing.
Moreover, the concept that purchase money security simply is not
"property belonging to the taxpayer"-the most frequent justification for
unperfected purchase money priority before the F.T.L.A.-lacks viabil-
ity in this post-U.C.C. world, where title to collateral is immaterial.
Under section 9-301(l)(b) of the U.C.C., an unperfected security interest,
whether purchase money or non-purchase money, is subordinate to a lien
creditor. Analogizing the filed federal tax lien to a lien creditor using the
section 6323(h)(1) definition of security interest, it follows that all secur-
ity interests arising before tax lien filing should be subject to the perfec-
tion requirement. Under this analysis, a lender who obtains a purchase
money security interest on April 1 and perfects on May 1, like the non-
purchase money secured party, would be superior to a federal tax lien
filed June 1.
The pre-tax lien filing purchase money security interest should be
entitled to an extra measure of protection, however, in the case of
delayed perfection and an intervening federal tax lien. Because section 9-
301(2) of the U.C.C. permits a purchase money security interest per-
fected within ten days of the date the debtor receives possession of the
208. I.R.C. § 6323(h)(1) (1982).
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collateral to prevail against an intervening lien creditor,20 9 this also
should be permitted under the F.T.L.A. Thus, if a seller sells, obtains a
security interest in, and delivers certain personal property to the debtor/
taxpayer on May 1, and the federal tax lien is filed May 3, the seller
should obtain priority if it files its financing statement on or before May
11, the ten-day grace period of U.C.C. section 9-301(2).
Purchase money security interests arising after tax lien filing also
deserve greater protection. In the post-filing arena the lien creditor anal-
ogy begins to break down, despite section 6321's broad coverage of a
taxpayer's property. The real contest in this post-filing period is between
the federal tax lien and the purchase money security interest, because the
filed federal tax lien would generally prevail over other third-party inter-
ests under sections 6321 and 6323(a). 21 0 The government, a non-reliance
creditor, is not prejudiced by the failure to perfect. Moreover, once a
federal tax lien is filed the taxpayer may find it increasingly difficult to
obtain credit sources, and a policy that encourages enhancement of the
taxpayer's estate takes on new importance. In light of the strong indicia
of legislative and Treasury Department intent to favor purchase money
interests without reference to perfection, there is little reason to subject
post-filing purchase money security interests to the rigors of section
6323(h)(1). Thus, if a tax lien is filed on June 1, and the seller sells the
debtor/taxpayer certain property on August 1 and obtains a security in-
terest, its unperfected purchase money security interest should prevail
over the federal tax lien.
The definition of a purchase money security interest, apart from the
express requirements of section 6323(h)(1), should continue to be the
province of state law because the F.T.L.A. was designed to conform to
the provisions of the U.C.C. Substantial simultaneity of purchase money
transactions is a primary criterion in existing definitions of purchase
money status, and there is no persuasive reason to render it a mixed ques-
tion of state and federal law. If a security interest is deemed purchase
money for purposes of state law, it should be so deemed for purposes of
the F.T.L.A.
Actual knowledge should play no role in a court's determination of
purchase money priority. Any inequity that may result is outweighed by
209. See U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1978).
Plumb concurs that a purchase money security interest perfected within the 10-day grace
period of U.C.C. § 9-301(2) "will be protected from either antecedent or intervening federal
tax liens, since there is never a time when the security interest, although yet unfiled, is not
protected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien.' " Plumb, supra note 7, at 669.
210. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1982).
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the need for predictability and uniformity. If improperly perfected before
tax lien filing, the purchase money secured creditor should receive no
better treatment vis-a-vis the federal tax lien than it would against a lien
creditor under U.C.C. section 9-301, the government's actual knowledge
notwithstanding. And similarly, the purchase money secured party's
knowledge of an existing filed tax lien should not subvert its post-filing
priority.
Finally, the author proposes that the foregoing treatment should be
embodied in statutory form within the present structure of the F.T.L.A.
No satisfactory reason existed for Congress to ignore the carefully
charted route urged by the ABA in 1966. In light of continuing uncer-
tainty about purchase money priority, no satisfactory reason exists today
for continuing to tolerate that legislative void. The question of federal
tax lien priority over a security interest is one of federal law, 2 11 and sec-
tion 6323(a) already sets forth the principal priority rule affecting secur-
ity interests and other third parties.2 12 Hence, a simple amendment to
the superpriorities section of the F.T.L.A. would serve the intended pur-
pose. The author therefore proposes the following new subsection to sec-
tion 6323(b):
(b) PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN INTERESTS EVEN THOUGH NOTICE
FILED.-Even though notice of a lien imposed by section 6321 has
been filed, such lien shall not be valid-
(11) as against a purchase money security interest, whether arising
before or after tax lien filing, if such interest otherwise satisfies the
requirements of section 6323(h)(1); provided, however, that perfection
shall not be required for a purchase money security interest arising
after tax lien filing.
This provision, though similar in thrust to the provisions urged by the
ABA and the American Banker's Association at the time of the congres-
sional hearings, differs from the latter primarily in its waiver of a post-tax
lien filing perfection requirement. 2
13
The application of the proposed new "superpriority" may be illus-
trated by returning to the hypotheticals posed in the introduction to this
Article. The pre-filing purchase money secured creditor whose interest is
211. See Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); see also U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1978).
212. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1982).
213. The ABA proposal would have applied to equitable or statutory vendor's liens as well
as to consensual security interests, and would have required purchase money lenders (as op-
posed to sellers) to show entitlement "to priority over preexisting liens against the purchaser."
See supra note 95 & accompanying text. The American Banker's Association proposal would
have required all purchase money security to have "priority over preexisting security interests
covering after-acquired property" in order to prevail over a filed federal tax lien. See supra
note 112 & accompanying text.
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perfected at the time of tax lien filing would enjoy the same priority as
the non-purchase money counterpart, by direct reference to the "security
interest" definition of section 6323(h)(1). The post-filing purchase
money secured creditor, unlike its non-purchase money counterpart,
would also be protected against a filed tax lien, even though the purchase
money security interest is unperfected. In the case of an intervening fed-
eral tax lien, the proposed superpriority provision would also result in
limited protection to the purchase money secured party if it "satisfies the
requirements of section 6323(h)(1)." That section, in turn, requires that
the interest be "protected under local law against a subsequent judgment
lien," thus invoking the provisions of U.C.C. section 9-301. Because sec-
tion 9-301(2) permits a previously unperfected purchase money secured
party to prevail over an intervening lien creditor if filing is accomplished
within ten days after debtor's possession, the purchase money secured
party should be accorded a ten-day grace period within which to perfect
against an intervening filed tax lien. Beyond this express grant of post-
filing purchase money priority, questions of definition and scope will be
subject to the same statutory analysis as other security interests under
the F.T.L.A.
Conclusion
Despite the confusion created by Congress' failure to enact a
purchase money superpriority as part of the F.T.L.A., case law, legisla-
tive history, and policy can join to support the concept of purchase
money priority. The amendment proposed in this Article would ex-
pressly validate that concept and delineate its contours. By tracking the
requirements of section 6323(h)(1) in the case of all pre-tax lien filing
security interests, the proposal would avoid further ambiguities of con-
struction. Its post-filing liberality would promote the policies underlying
purchase money priority. The proposed superpriority would serve as an
interpretative road map in unfamiliar and confusing terrain. By the ad-
dition of this clarifying language, Congress can alleviate the "tortured
meanderings" of federal tax lien law and pave the way for resolution of
future priority disputes.
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